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INTRODUCTION
Unlike previous revisions to the estate and gift tax provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code,' sections 2701-2704 of the Code2 and the pro-
vision which preceded them3 treat extremely sophisticated estate plan-
ning techniques.4 Chapter 145 and its predecessor were clearly aimed
1. All references to the Internal Revenue Code are to the Code of 1986, as amended and in
effect as of the date of this Article, unless otherwise indicated.
2. I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (1994).
3. Section 2036(c), the predecessor of sections 2701-2704, was enacted as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10402, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-431 to
1330-432. Section 2036(c) was substantially amended by the Technical and Miscellaneous Reve-
nue Act (TAMRA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3031, 102 Stat. 3342, 3634-40. Section 2036(c)
was retroactively repealed and replaced by sections 2701-2704 in the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 11601-02, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-490 to 1388-501.
4. The two major estate tax reform acts in recent years, the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, and the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
34, 95 Stat. 172, focused on the basic elements of estate and gift taxes. While some provisions of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 were quite complex (for example, section 2032A dealing with the
valuation of farms for estate tax purposes), the thrust of the legislation was to unify the estate
and gift taxes. Most of the major changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 dealt with basic
issues such as tax rates and the marital deduction, as well as changing the previous estate and gift
tax deductions to a unified credit. See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010, 2056, 2502, 2505. The main provi-
sions of ERTA again concerned basic estate tax provisions, such as the unified credit, the marital
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at restricting if not eliminating "estate freezing."' 6 But Chapter 14
goes much further. In addition to traditional estate freezing tech-
niques, it attempts to limit business buy-sell agreements, 7 lapses of
voting rights,8 and the valuation of retained interests in trusts.9 These
areas, particularly retained interests in trusts, unlike the corporate
stock recapitalization and similar techniques which provided the im-
petus for the enactment of the predecessor to Chapter 14, had never
been extensively used for estate freezing purposes and were not
widely viewed as abusive. 10
Section 2036(c), the predecessor to Chapter 14, adopted an estate
tax inclusion approach to estate freezing problems.1' Many commen-
tators and critics argued that this was the wrong method to combat
abusive estate freezes. 12 The argument was repeatedly made that the
abusive estate freeze was a problem of valuation rather than one of
inclusion or exclusion. 13 Chapter 14 responded to these criticisms by
taking a valuation approach to the common estate freezing tech-
deduction, gifts within three years of death, and the gift tax annual exclusion. See I.R.C. §§ 2010,
2056, 2503, 2035.
For a discussion of section 2032A of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, see Martin D. Begleiter,
Section 2032A: Did We Save The Family Farm?, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 15 (1979-80); Martin D.
Begleiter, Special Use Valuation Nine Years Later: A Farewell to Farms, 63 TAXES 659 (1985).
5. Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code encompasses sections 2701-2704.
6. H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1043 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-378,
2313-659; see Richard L. Dees, Section 2036(c): The Monster That Ate Estate Planning and In-
stallment Sales, Buy-Sells, Options, Employment Contracts and Leases, 66 TAXES 876, 876-78
(1988); see also Martin D. Begleiter, Estate Planning in the Nineties: Friday the Thirteenth, Chap-
ter 14: Jason Goes to Washington-Part 1, 81 Ky. L.J. 535 (1992-93) [hereinafter Begleiter, Ja-
son-Part 1] (exploring the history of section 2036(c) and section 2701 regarding estate freezing).
7. I.R.C. § 2703. A discussion of this section is beyond the scope of this Article.
8. Id. § 2704. A discussion of this section is beyond the scope of this Article.
9. Id. § 2702.
10. Begleiter, Jason-Part 1, supra note 6, at 536-44.
11. I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1989).
12. "Discussion Draft" Relating to Estate Valuation Freezes: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong. 92-109 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of E.
James Gamble, American College of Trust & Estate Counsel); id. at 53-66 (statement of John A.
Wallace, Director, A.B.A. Probate & Trust Division); id. at 67-91 (statement of Jere D. McGaf-
fey, Chair-Elect, A.B.A. Section of Taxation); EXPLANATORY MATERIAL CONCERNING COMMIT-
TEE ON FINANCE 1990 RECONCILIATION SUBMISSION PURSUANT TO HOUSE CONCURRENT
RESOLUTION 310, 136 CONG. REC. S15629, S15680 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990) [hereinafter SENATE
EXPLANATORY MATERIAL]. Due to the short deadline, the Senate Budget Committee sent the
reconciliation bill to the floor without printing a formal report. The reports submitted by the
various senate committees, including the Senate Finance Committee, were submitted in lieu of a
formal report at the beginning of the debate. Id. at S15629 (statement of Sen. Sasser); see S.
Stacy Eastland, The Legacy of I.R.C. Section 2036(c): Saving the Closely Held Business After
Congress Made "Enterprise" a Dirty Word, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 259, 327-28 (1989).
13. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 12, at 92, 94 (statement of E. James Gamble, American
College of Trust & Estate Counsel).
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niques: preferred stock recapitulations and partnership freezes. 14 In-
deed, probably the most significant difference between former section
2036(c) and Chapter 14 is that section 2036(c) took an estate inclusion
approach while the latter involved a valuation approach to the
problem.
Estate Planning in the Nineties: Friday the Thirteenth, Chapter 14:
Jason Goes to Washington-Part I (Jason-Part 1) evaluated the effect
of Code section 2701 on estate freezes, particularly the preferred stock
recapitalization. 15 Jason-Part I concluded that while under a Chap-
ter 14 regime estate freezes might be more difficult and less effective
than they were prior to 1987,16 partial freezes were likely still possible
and could, in the right situation, be beneficial. 17 More importantly for
present purposes, Jason-Part I concluded that section 2701 correctly
identified the source of the possible abuse inherent in estate freezing
as a gift tax valuation problem (as former section 2036(c) did not).18
Section 2702, however, deals with a completely different problem
than section 2701. Section 2702 deals with transfers by a grantor in
trust where the grantor retains an interest. 19 Unlike estate freezes,
particularly preferred stock recapitalizations, this was not a well
known and widely discussed estate planning technique in 1987 or in-
deed in 1990.20 Nor was it certain prior to 1990 whether the tech-
niques against which section 2702 was directed were abusive. Section
2702 was somewhat of a tagalong to the estate freeze legislation, and it
is uncertain if the valuation rationale correctly employed to combat
estate freezes in section 2701 is effective on the transfers covered by
section 2702.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze section 2702 to determine if
Congress correctly reasoned that the problem with the transactions it
14. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(1); Begleiter, Jason-Part I, supra note 6, at 557-58.
15. Begleiter, Jason-Part I, supra note 6.
16. Id. at 583-84.
17. Id. at 584. Recent literature, particularly concerning family limited partnership freezes
and limited liability companies, appears to agree with this conclusion. See, e.g., Richard L. Dees,
The Slaying of Frankenstein's Monster: The Repeal and Replacement of Section 2036(c), 69
TAXES 151, 156 (1991); Kenneth D. Esch & Pamela L. Spaccarotella, Limited Liability Compa-
nies as an Alternative Choice of Entity for Farming and Ranching Operations in the State of
Nebraska, 28 CREIGrroN L. REv. 19,47 (1994); John H. Gardner, Planning with Chapter 14 and
GSTInteraction, 21 EsT. PLAN. 146, 149-50 (1994); Richard M. Horwood, Limited Liability Com-
panies Provide New Planning Options, 21 EsT. PLAN. 266, 272 (1994); Brenda S. Sanford, Family
Farms: A Conversion to a Limited Partnership May Protect the Farm from Liquidation, 11 T.M.
COOLEY L. REv. 861, 903-07 (1994); Andrew J. Willms, Family Limited Partnerships and Limited
Liability Companies: New Estate Planning Tools for the 90s, 76 Wis. LAW. 17, 19 (1994).
18. Begleiter, Jason-Part I, supra note 6, at 584.
19. I.R.C. § 2702(a).
20. See discussion infra Part I.
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sought to regulate under section 2702 was a gift tax valuation prob-
lem, similar to section 2701.21 In examining that issue, a number of
subsidiary issues become apparent and are discussed.22 This Article
concludes that the inclusion of trust interests in the estate freezing
statute was ill-advised. The "problem" Congress saw in retained inter-
ests in trusts is different in type from that involved in the typical estate
freeze.23 More importantly, any "abuse" involved in the transactions
covered by section 2702 arose from decisions which long predate cor-
porate stock recapitalizations. 24 This abuse stems from an entirely dif-
ferent source than does the "abuse" in preferred stock
recapitalizations and similar transactions. 25 The estate tax leverage
gained by using the techniques against which section 2702 was di-
rected does not involve valuation problems at all. It involves inclu-
sion/exclusion problems that have existed for more than fifty years
and have been around for far longer than estate freezes. 26 Moreover,
it is distinctly possible that no abuse (or very limited abuse) exists in
the transactions covered by section 2702.27 In any event, the valuation
approach used in section 2702 creates far more complications than are
necessary to correct any abuses arising from the techniques against
which Congress directed the section. Once the cause of the leverage
gained by using these techniques is correctly identified, any abuses can
be remedied with minor statutory changes. 28
Prior to analyzing section 2702, it is necessary to supplement the
examination of the history of estate freezes contained in Jason-Part I
with some discussion of the techniques against which section 2702 is
aimed29 and the extent to which they were viewed as abusive, both
prior to 1987 and in 1990.30 Some discussion of the operation of sec-
tion 2702 is also necessary.31 However, like Jason-Part I, this Article
is intended to be neither a detailed explanation of Code section 2702
21. See discussion infra Part II.D.
22. For example, given the broad scope of section 2702, the question of whether any or all the
transactions covered by the section are abusive must be considered. See discussion infra Part Ill.
Assuming some of the transactions are abusive, the question of whether the statute applies to
more transactions than necessary to prevent the abuse identified becomes significant. In addi-
tion, the remedy chosen (a valuation of zero on interests retained by the grantor) deserves
examination.
23. See discussion infra Part VIII.B.
24. See discussion infra Part VIII.B.1.
25. See discussion infra Part VIII.B.l.
26. See discussion infra Part VIII.B.1.
27. See discussion infra Part V.
28. See discussion infra Part VIII.
29. See discussion mnfra Part I.
30. See discussion infra Part II.
31. See discussion mnfra Part Il.
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and the regulations thereunder, nor an analysis of every provision of
the section, nor a suggestion for technical changes necessary in the
statute. The focus is on whether any abuse exists in the techniques
section 2702 was enacted to regulate and whether the perceived
abuses were really valuation problems.
I. GRITs AND JOINT PURCHASES: LATECOMERS TO
ESTATE FREEZING
It is quite clear that section 2702 was enacted to restrict the use of
the grantor retained income trust (GRIT) and the joint purchase.3 2
Therefore, an examination of the workings of these devices, the tax
savings inherent in each and the treatment of each prior to 1990 is in
order.
A. The GRIT
Tax lawyers were well aware of estate freezes and their advantages
by the 1970s.33 In contrast, the GRIT was unknown until the early
1980s. The first major treatment of the GRIT was given by Richard
Covey in April of 1984 in the course of discussing a change in the
valuation tables from six percent to ten percent. 34 Quite simply, a
GRIT is a trust in which the grantor retains the income interest for a
term of years which is expected to expire prior to his death.3 5 When
the trust is created, a gift is made. However, the gift is only the value
of the remainder interest.36 The reason for this is obvious: any inter-
32. See supra note 12 (explaining the absence of a Senate report); see also H.R. CoNry. REP.
No. 101-964, at 1130-33 (adopting the Senate provisions on this point); Mitchell M. Gans,
GRIT's, GRAT's and GRUT's, Planning and Policies, 11 VA. TAX REV. 761, 822 (1992) (stating
that Congress' objective in enacting section 2702 was to close down the GRIT as a tax-savings
strategy).
33. Begleiter, Jason-Part 1, supra note 6, at 539-41.
34. PRACTICAL DRAFTINo Apr. 1984, at 397-430 (Richard B. Covey ed.). The GRIT (or as it
was referred to in the article, "the Grantor Income Trust For Term of Years") was introduced as
a "New Planning Opportunity." Id. at 403-22. The term "grantor retained income trust" was first
used by PRACTICAL DRAF-rNO in the January 1985 issue. PRACTICAL DlAT[No Jan. 1985, at
586 (Richard B. Covey ed.). The acronym GRIT first appeared in that publication in 1988.
PRACTICAL DRAFrn,.o Jan. 1988, at 1338 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
35. PRACTICAL DRAFINo Apr. 1984, at 403 (Richard B. Covey ed.); see also Jonathan G.
Blattmachr & Mitchell M. Gans, An Analysis of the TAMRA Changes to the Valuation Freeze
Rules: Part 1, 70 J. TAX'N 14, 18 (1989) ("A GRIT is an estate planning tool which has become
popular in recent years: an irrevocable trust under which the grantor retains an income interest
for a fixed period after which the remainder passes to or for other persons.").
36. I.R.C. § 2501 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e), (h)(7) (as amended in 1994); see also id.
§ 25.2512-5(d)(2) (1994) ("When the donor transfers property in trust or otherwise and retains
an interest therein, generally, the value of the gift is the value of the property transferred less the
value of the donor's retained interest."). The regulation then refers to section 2702 for the valu-
ation of transfers after October 8, 1990. Id.
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est retained by the donor in the GRIT (the right to the income for the
term of years) is not transferred. A person cannot make a transfer to
himself in the gift tax sense.37 Therefore, the value of the gift is sub-
stantially less than the value of the property transferred. For example,
assuming a ten percent interest rate, the value of the retained income
interest in a ten year GRIT where the GRIT is funded with $1,000,000
is $614,457.38 Therefore, the value of the remainder (and the value of
the taxable gift) in such a GRIT is $385,543. Assuming the grantor
survives the term of the GRIT, the grantor transfers $1,000,000 worth
of property (plus any appreciation) to the remaindermen for the cost
of the gift tax on $385,543. 39 In addition, the value of the gift is "fro-
zen" in the sense that the appreciation is never subject to a transfer
tax in the grantor's hands.40 Of course, if the grantor dies during the
term of the GRIT, the trust property is included in the grantor's gross
estate at its full value on the date of the grantor's death.41 Therefore,
most creators of GRITs included a provision leaving the property to
the grantor's estate if the grantor dies during the trust term.42 To fur-
ther reduce the value of the gift and the gift tax, some authorities have
discussed including a commutation power in the GRIT (that is, a
power of the trustee to distribute to the grantor that portion of the
trust equal to the value of the grantor's interest in the trust).4 3 In
summary, GRITs were advantageous because they leveraged the uni-
37. For transfers made after April 30, 1989, subject to section 2702, a qualified retained inter-
est is valued under section 7520. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1994).
38. Actually, the term-of-years values are not given; they are derived by subtracting the values
in Table B from one. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d)(2)(iii), (6) (1994).
39. If the grantor in this example had made no prior gifts, she would pay no gift tax because
the gift tax would be fully covered by the unified credit. I.R.C. § 2505.
40. In re Mainzer, 573 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sur. Ct. 1991); PRACnCAL DRAFrING Apr. 1984, at 403
(Richard B. Covey ed.); Harry F. Lee, The Economics of a GRIT, 68 TAXES 555, 556 (1990).
41. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (as amended by T.D. 6501, 1995-36 I.R.B.
8).
42. Mainzer, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 129-30; PRACTICAL DRAFNG Apr. 1984, at 403 (Richard B.
Covey ed.).
43. See, e.g., PRACTICAL DRIrnGo Apr. 1984, at 401-03 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACTICAL
DRANrING July 1984, at 484-85,487 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACTICAL DRAFrNG Oct. 1984, at
546-47 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACTICAL DRAFr No Jan. 1985, at 583-85 (Richard B. Covey
ed.); PRACTICAL DRAING July 1985, at 710-12 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACTICAL DRAFING
Apr. 1986, at 905-06 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACTICAL DRAFMN Jan. 1987, at 1072-73 (Rich-
ard B. Covey ed.); PRACTICAL DRAFI NG Apr. 1987, at 1113-14 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACn-
CAL DRAFTNG Jan. 1988, at 1341 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACTICAL DRAFrnIo July 1988, at
1524 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACICAL DRAFTING Apr. 1989, at 1693-94 (Richard B. Covey
ed.); PRACTCAL DRAiNG July 1989, at 1795-96 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACTCAL DRAFTI G
Apr. 1990, at 2096-97 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACMTCAL DRATNG July 1991, at 2457-58
(Richard B. Covey ed.); see also Byrle M. Abbin, Taking the Temperature of Asset Value Freeze
Approaches: What's Hot, What's Not, 66 TAXES 3, 20 (1988) (suggesting the inclusion of a com-
mutation power to counter the effect of discrimination against community property taxpayers).
8 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1
fled credit by transferring property to the remaindermen at a reduced
gift tax cost."4
B. Joint Purchase
The joint purchase is likewise quite simple in concept. An asset is
purchased jointly by a member or members of the older generation in
a family and by a member or members of the younger generation in
the same family or by a trust for their benefit.45 The older generation
purchases and holds a life estate, while the younger generation
purchases the remainder.46 Each purchaser contributes the value of
his or her interest, as determined by the Treasury tables.47 Since each
purchaser paid consideration equal to the value of the interest
purchased, no gift is made on the purchase.48 When the older genera-
tion purchaser dies, since he or she owns only a life estate, nothing is
included in his or her gross estate.49 Therefore, property is trans-
ferred to the members of the younger generation (or trusts for their
benefit) at no transfer tax cost and at a value far greater than the
purchase price paid.
44. Perhaps the best and most succinct summary was given by Surrogate Roth in In re
Mainzer.
A GRIT is a commonly used "estate freeze" technique which permits an older gener-
ation of a family to pass along future appreciation of family owned corporations or
partnerships to a younger generation at considerable tax savings. Such savings result
from splitting the assets used to fund the trust into two parts, one, an income interest
which the grantor retains, the other, a remainder interest which is passed on to a
younger generation of the grantor's family. The gift tax is assessed on the present value
of the remainder interest. If the grantor survives the trust term, the remainder interest
(including appreciation) passes to the remaindermen without any further transfer tax.
If the grantor dies during the trust period, the trust principal, although still distributed
to the remaindermen, is nonetheless included in the grantor's estate for Federal estate
tax purposes. Thus, most trust instruments also provide that if the grantor dies during
the trust term, the trust corpus reverts to the grantor's estate. Such a contingent rever-
sionary interest has two benefits, viz., it permits the grantor to make a different disposi-
tion of the corpus and it entitles the grantor to an additional gift tax discount based on
his or her actuarial life expectancy.
Mainzer, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 129-30.
45. PRACTICAL DRAFnNG Apr. 1986, at 859, 895 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 861-62; PRACCAL DRAFrING July 1986, at 971 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
49. See PRACTICAL DRATNo Apr. 1986, at 864-69 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACTICAL
DRAmrlNo Jan. 1988, at 1352-54 (Richard B. Covey ed.). But see Gradow v. United States, 897
F.2d 516,518-19 (9th Cir. 1990); PRACTICAL DRAFTING Apr. 1987, at 1129-32 (Richard B. Covey
ed.); PRACTICAL DRAFrING Jan. 1988, at 1345-52 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
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II. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS AND ACTION PRIOR TO 1990
A. The Early Legislative Proposals
As related in Jason-Part 1,50 an article by Professor George
Cooper of Columbia Law School5l extensively analyzed some of the
estate freezing techniques existing in the late 1970s and stimulated in-
terest in tax reform. As described in Jason-Part I, from 1977 to 1987
there were a number of tax reform efforts.5 2 The first was a set of
proposals by the Treasury Department in 1984.53 These proposals
mentioned neither GRITs nor joint purchases by name. They did pro-
pose, however, that in cases where the grantor retained an interest in
the property transferred, no gift or estate tax would be imposed until
the grantor's interest terminated.5 4 This was part of a larger effort to
coordinate the estate and gift taxes and reduce complexity in the
Code.5 5 Had this proposal been adopted, the advantages of a GRIT
would have been eliminated, since no gift would have occurred until
the term of years had expired. Joint purchases would not have been
affected.
The President's tax proposal contained no provision relating to the
topics under discussion.5 6 A revision of the Treasury proposals re-
moved the "hard to complete" gift tax rule originally proposed.5 7 At
the request of the Treasury Department, the Section of Taxation of
the American Bar Association appointed a task force to study transfer
tax reform. The task force's report58 was never formally adopted by
the Section of Taxation or the American Bar Association,5 9 nor did it
become the basis of legislation. However, its recommendations,
which would have greatly impacted GRITs, will be discussed subse-
quently.60 These efforts piqued legislative interest in estate freezing
and set the stage for congressional action.
50. Begleiter, Jason-Part I, supra note 6, at 539-41.
51. George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoid-
ance, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 161, 170-81 (1977).
52. Begleiter, Jason-Part 1, supra note 6, at 544-45.
53. See 2 U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND Eco-
NOMIC GROwTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1984).
54. Id. at 378-79.
55. Id. at 378; see discussion infra Part VIII.B.
56. See RONALD W. REAGAN, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR
FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY (1985).
57. PRACTICAL DRAFTING July 1985, at 718-19 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
58. Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring, Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 1987
A.B.A. SEC. OF TAX'N, reprinted in 41 TAX LAW. 395 (1988) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
59. Id. at 395 n.*.
60. See discussion infra Part VIII.B.
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B. Section 2036(c), 1987 Version: The Estate Inclusion Approach
By 1987, Congress was ready to control estate freezing. The staffs
of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the House Ways and Means
Committee prepared a description of revenue raising options. 61 As to
estate freezing, the proposals discussed the elimination of minority
discounts and the inclusion in the gross estate of the value of common
stock transferred in a recapitalization. 62 The House bill included both
proposals;63 the Senate included neither.64 The Conference Commit-
tee approved only the estate freeze proposal, which became Code sec-
tion 2036(c).65
Section 2036(c), as originally enacted, contained nothing specific
about GRITs or joint purchases. 66 The legislative history makes it
abundantly clear that the focus of the legislation was on corporate
recapitalizations. 67 It is unclear whether GRITs and joint purchases
were even considered. Nevertheless, uncertainty as to the scope of
the provision led at least one commentator to question whether
GRITs and joint purchases were subject to the statute, and his tenta-
tive conclusion was that neither should be.68
These conjectures became irrelevant in a brief time. As noted in
Jason-Part/,69 it quickly became apparent that, as originally enacted,
section 2036(c) was overbroad and inadequate to deal with the estate
freezing problem.70
C. Section 2036(c), 1988 Version
The uncertainty inherent in the original version of section 2036(c)
resulted in major changes in 1988.71 In the Technical and Miscellane-
61. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N WITH THE STAFF OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 100TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUES PREPARED
FOR THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 265-67 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter OPTIONS].
62. Id.
63. H.R. 3545, 100th Cong. (1987).
64. See S. 1920, 100th Cong. (1987).
65. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10402, 101 Stat. 1330,
1330-431 to 1330-432.
66. I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1988).
67. H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1063 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-78,
2313-678 to 2313-679; H.R. CoN. REP. No. 100-495, at 994-96 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1245, 1740-42; OrToNS, supra note 61, at 265-67.
68. PRACTICAL DRArTNo Apr. 1988, at 1430-32 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
69. Begleiter, Jason-Part I, supra note 6, at 547.
70. Dees, supra note 6, at 887; see also Wayne M. Gazur, Congressional Diversions: Legisla-
tive Responses to the Estate Valuation Freeze, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 95, 123 (1989) (asserting that the
legislation was widely criticized by many as vague and poorly conceived).
71. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act (TAMRA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 3031, 102 Stat. 3342, 3634-40.
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ous Revenue Act (TAMRA), Congress attempted to clarify section
2036(c) and provide safe harbors.72 For purposes of this Article, how-
ever, the significance of the TAMRA amendments is that, for the first
time, the GRIT is specifically mentioned. 73
TAMRA established that section 2036(c) did not apply to a GRIT
which met the following requirements:
1. the GRIT lasted 10 years or less;
2. the income interest was retained by the grantor; and
3. the grantor was not the trustee. 74
The inclusion of the so-called "statutory GRIT" as a safe harbor
clearly raised the question of whether a common law GRIT was sub-
ject to section 2036(c) by negative inference.75
As noted in Jason-Part I, even the extensive amendments made by
TAMRA were insufficient to solve the problems of the original sec-
tion 2036(c). 76 Under the broad regulatory authority granted it in the
statute, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) attempted to provide
guidance to practitioners.77 In advance of regulations, the Service is-
sued an "administrative pronouncement" in the form of I.R.S. Notice
89-99.78 The Notice clearly stated the Service's view that section
2036(c) applied to GRITs and joint purchases based on its belief that
the safe harbors enacted by TAMRA were illustrative of the types of
arrangements that fell within the scope of the statute.79
72. For the text of section 2036(c), as amended by TAMRA, and a discussion of its provisions,
see Begleiter, Jason-Part I, supra note 6, at 548-55.
73. Section 2036(c)(6), as amended by TAMRA, provided an exception for a GRIT meeting
certain requirements (the so-called "statutory GRIT"). See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
74. Section 2036(c)(6), as amended by TAMRA, provided as follows:
(6) Treatment of certain grantor retained income trusts.-
(A) In General.-For purposes of this subsection, any retention of a qualified trust
income interest shall be disregarded and the property with respect to which such inter-
est exists shall be treated as held by the transferor while such income interest continues.
(B) Qualified Trust Income Interest.-For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term
"qualified trust income interest" means any right to receive amounts determined solely
by reference to the income from property held in trust if-
(i) such right is for a period not exceeding 10 years,
(ii) the person holding such right transferred the property to the trust, and
(iii) such person is not the trustee of such trust.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act (TAMRA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 3031, 102
Stat. 3342, 3635.
75. PRACMTCAL DRAnnNo Jan. 1989, at 1661-64 (Richard B. Covey ed.); Dees, supra note 6, at
888-93.
76. Begleiter, Jason-Part I, supra note 6, at 553-55.
77. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(8) (1988).
78. I.R.S. Notice 89-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422, 435.
79. Id. at 423 & n.2.
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D. The Aftermath
Jason-Part I described the problems of section 2036(c), even as
"clarified" by I.R.S. Notice 89-99,80 and the severe criticism of the sec-
tion by leading practitioners and estate planning organizations. 8' As
therein stated, one of the major problems was that the estate tax inclu-
sion approach of section 2036(c) was the wrong approach to the prob-
lem.82 The leaders of the estate planning bar argued that any
problems caused by estate freezing were not problems of inclusion or
exclusion, but problems of gift tax valuation at the time of the
freeze.83 More significant for purposes of this Article, however, is that
many of these commentators argued that trusts (including GRITs)
and joint purchases should not be treated the same way as corporate
and partnership freezes.84 Accordingly, a task force composed of
members of the three leading estate planning organizations drafted a
proposal to revise section 2036(c). 85 The proposal specifically and in-
tentionally did not deal with GRITs or joint purchases.
In the Spring of 1990, Representative Rostenkowski, then Chair of
the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced a discussion draft
of a new statute that would repeal section 2036(c) and substitute a gift
tax valuation approach. A hearing on the discussion draft was held on
April 24, 1990.86 On June 27, 1990, the Senate Finance Committee
and two subcommittees held a joint hearing on the discussion draft
and on August 1, 1990, Chairman Rostenkowski introduced H.R.
5425, which elaborated on and modified the discussion draft.87
The Senate soon followed suit. On September 26, 1990, Senators
Bentsen, Boren and Daschale introduced S. 3113, which repealed sec-
tion 2036(c) and proposed a revised method of regulating estate
freezes. 88 On October 13, 1990, S. 3113 was modified to incorporate
80. Begleiter, Jason-Part 1, supra note 6, at 556-58.
81. Id. at 557.
82. Hearings, supra note 12, at 92-109 (statement of E. James Gamble, American College of
Trust and Estate Counsel); id. at 53-66 (statement of John A. Wallace, Director, A.B.A. Probate
& Trust Division); id. at 67-91 (statement of Jere D. McGaffey, Chair-Elect, A.B.A. Section of
Taxation); SENATE EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra note 12, at S15680.
83. Hearings, supra note 12, at 97-98 (statement of E. James Gamble, American College of
Trust & Estate Counsel); id. at 64-65 (statement of John A. Wallace, Director, A.B.A. Probate &
Trust Division); id. at 71 (statement of Jere D. McGaffey, Chair-Elect, A.B.A. Section of
Taxation).
84. See supra note 83.
85. Memorandum from the Joint Task Force Drafting Committee 1-6 (on file with the DePaul
Law Review).
86. Begleiter, Jason-Part I, supra note 6, at 558.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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many of the key provisions of H.R. 5425.89 The Senate bill became
sections 11,601 and 11,602 of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990,
which was incorporated into the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA) of 1990, enacted on November 5, 1990.90
III. SECTION 2702: NIGHTMARE ON PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE
This Part is intended only to provide an overview of section 2702.
Many details and qualifications are omitted, as the purpose of this Ar-
ticle is to evaluate whether the valuation approach reflected in section
2702 with regard to GRITs and joint purchases is correct. Any at-
tempt at a detailed summary of the many qualifications and complica-
tions of section 2702 would detract rather than enhance this effort.
Some of the details are, however, given in the footnotes of this Part.
Other details will be given in later Parts as they become relevant to
the discussion. 91
The basic rule of section 2702 is that when a person creates a trust
for a member of his or her family92 and retains an interest in that trust,
the value of the retained interest (unless it is a qualified interest) is
zero. 93 The statute is applicable only for determining the value of the
89. Id.
90. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 11601-02, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-490 to 1388-501.
91. For more detailed explanations of the mechanics of section 2702, see PRACnCAL DRAFr-
rNo Jan. 1991, at 2370-78 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACTICAL DRAFrNG Apr. 1991, at 2433-88
(Richard B. Covey ed.); John M. Beehler, Trust Estate Freeze Valuation Rules Under the Final
Section 2702 Regulations, 70 TAXEs 604 (1992); Dees, supra note 6; Gans, supra note 32; Louis S.
Harrison, The Real Implications of the New Transfer Tax Valuation Rules-Success or Failure?,
47 TAX LAW 885 (1994); Don W. Llewellyn, The Evolution of Sophisticated Tax Planning for
Lifetime Gifts-What Planning Techniques Continue to Be Effective?, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 213 (1995); Carlyn S. McCaffrey, GRATs and QPRTs, Split Interest Transfers: An Estate
Planner's Panacea?, 20 AM. C. TR. & EsT. CoUNs. NoTEs 47 (1994); Peter J. Melcher & Lucy M.
Arend, Grappling with GRATs, 72 TAXES 661 (1994); David W. Olsen, So... What's for Break-
fast: GRITs, GRATs or GRUTs?, 7 J. SuFFoLK ACAD. L. 49 (1990-91); Lloyd Leva Plaine &
Pam H. Schneider, Proposed Valuation Regulations Provide Workable Exceptions for Transfers
in Trust, 75 J. TAX'N 142 (1991).
92. A family member includes the grantor's spouse, the grantor's ancestors and lineal de-
scendants and their spouses, and the grantor's brothers and sisters and their spouses. I.R.C.
§§ 2702(c), 2704(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(a)(1) (1992); see also id. § 25.2702-1(c) (as
amended in 1995) (setting forth other exceptions to the rule).
93. I.R.C. § 2702(a)(1), (2) (1994). This rule is not applicable to a number of trusts, the most
important of which is the completely revocable trust. Id. § 2702(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-
1(c)(1) (as amended in 1995). Although the Code states an exception for a transfer "if such
transfer is an incomplete gift," I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(i), the regulations take the position that
only an entirely incomplete gift is excepted. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1995).
The position in the regulations appears to be the more logical one and is more consistent with
the legislative history. See PRACTICAL DPtAOFNG Apr. 1991, at 2442-44 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
Section 2702(a)(3) was changed by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 to substitute
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transfer and whether the transfer is a gift.94 Retained interests which
are qualified interests, in contrast, are valued by use of the Treasury
tables under section 7520.95 The only qualified interests are:
1. an annuity interest;96
2. a unitrust interest;97 and
3. a noncontingent remainder if all other interests are annuity
interests or unitrust interests.98
Transfers of term interests, which include life interests,99 are treated as
transfers in trust.10o Finally, joint purchases are treated as if the per-
son acquiring the term interest acquired the entire property and trans-
ferred the remainder interest to the other purchaser for the
consideration furnished by that purchaser. 101
The application of section 2702 to GRITs and joint purchases is dra-
conian. A grantor creating a common law GRIT would make a taxa-
ble gift of the entire value of the property transferred, since the
grantor's retained interest would be valued at zero. The same result
would befall a grantor creating a trust in which the grantor reserved a
life income interest. In each case, a gift tax would be assessed on the
full value of the trust property at the time the trust was created. This
rule killed the GRIT, except for personal residences. 02 If a parent
and a child jointly purchase an asset, with the parent buying a term of
years or a life interest and the child buying the remainder, the parent
is treated as purchasing the entire property, then transferring the re-
"incomplete gift" for "incomplete transfer." Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-188, § 1701(f)(11)(B)(i), 110 Stat. 1755, 1872.
Personal residence trusts (PRTs) and qualified personal residence trusts (QPRTs) are also
excepted from the Code's application. See I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii). A discussion of PRTs and
QPRTs is beyond the scope of this Article except for their relevance in evaluating the effective-
ness of the code. See discussion infra Part VI.F. For more information on PRTs, see Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2702-5 (as amended in 1992); PRACTICAL DRAFrNG Apr. 1992, at 2784-92 (Richard B.
Covey ed.); PRACTICAL DRAMrINO Oct. 1992, at 3012-15 (Richard B. Covey ed.); Gans, supra
note 32, at 851-78.
94. I.R.C. § 2702(a)(1). The rule is not applicable to future transfers of the retained interest
outside the grantor's family, to outright transfers, or to estate and generation-skipping taxes.
95. Id. § 2702(a)(2)(B). Portions of the tables are also reprinted in Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 20.2031-7(d)(6) (1994). See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(a) (1994) (discussing valuation of
annuities, unitrusts' interests, and other remainder or reversionary interests).
96. I.R.C. § 2702(b)(1).
97. Id. § 2702(b)(2).
98. Id. § 2702(b)(3). This qualified interest will not be further considered in this Article.
99. Id. § 2702(c)(3).
100. Id. § 2702(c)(1).
101. Id. § 2702(c)(2).
102. Dees, supra note 17, at 163. Transfers of personal residences, if qualified, are exempt
from section 2702. See I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii).
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mainder to the child for the price paid by the child.'0 3 However, that
transfer is a transfer with a retained interest. 0 4 Therefore, the value
of the parent's retained term of years or life interest is zero, and the
parent is treated as making a gift of the entire value of the property
(less the consideration furnished by the child).1°5 This effectively
killed the joint purchase.
Outside of personal residences 0 6 and trusts for non-family mem-
bers, 0 7 the only types of vehicles remaining under section 2702 are
Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts (GRATs) lo 8 and Grantor Retained
Unitrusts (GRUTs).' °9
IV. WHY SECTION 2702 WAs ENACTED
Given the impact of section 2702 on trusts, some analysis of the
abuses Congress saw in the GRIT and the reasons for enacting the
structure deserve some examination. The question of whether GRITs
and joint purchases as they existed prior to 1987 were abusive is post-
poned until Part V.
An examination of the legislative history" o and of work by several
commentators"' identifies the following factors as contributing to the
advantages of a GRIT and to the concerns that GRITs and joint
purchases were abusive:
103. I.R.C. § 2702(c)(2); see SENATE EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra note 12, at S15682;
Neil E. Cass & Richard A. Campbell, New Internal Revenue Code Chapter Fourteen Replaces
Section 2036(c), 79 ILL B.J. 508, 512 (1991).
104. I.R.C. § 2702(a)(1); Cass & Campbell, supra note 103, at 512.
105. SENATE EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra note 12, at S15682; Cass & Campbell, supra
note 103, at 512.
106. Personal residence trusts are exempt from section 2702. I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii).
107. For example, a trust in which the grantor retained the income interest for a term of years,
after which the trust was terminated and the property distributed to the grantor's niece, would
not be subject to section 2702 because the niece is not a member of the grantor's family. See id.
§§ 2702(a), (e), 2704(c)(2). While this exception may be extremely beneficial to the grantor in
certain situations, it is doubtful that a large number of grantors will alter their dispositive
schemes to take advantage of this definition.
108. Id. § 2702(b)(1).
109. UL § 2702(b)(2). According to the commentary, the GRAT appears to offer more tax
savings opportunity than the GRUT. Gans, supra note 32, at 822-51; Harrison, supra note 91, at
917-23. This is bolstered by the fact that in the first few years following enactment of section
2702, far more letter rulings have involved GRATs than GRUTs. An examination of the indices
of CCH Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reports (as of July 23, 1996) reveals that 14 private letter
rulings and technical advice memorandums have involved GRATs and one private letter ruling
has involved a GRUT. Cumulative Index for Reports 1-310,3 Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (CCH)
15,523-580 (June 6, 1995); Latest Additions to Cumulative Index for Reports 1-310, 3 Fed. Est. &
Gift Tax Rep. (CCH) 15,505-520 (July 23, 1996). While not conclusive, of course, this implies
that lawyers believe GRATs offer tax advantages over GRUTs in many circumstances.
110. SENATE EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra note 12.
111. Gans, supra note 32; Harrison, supra note 91.
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1. the use of one interest rate to value a grantor's retained inter-
est, regardless of when the gift was made;
2. the fact that a grantor could retain a contingent remainder
interest in, and a testamentary power of appointment over,
the trust, which interests were given value for gift tax pur-
poses and which further reduced the value of the gift;
3. the use of the tables to value the retained interest did not
accurately value the retained interest in any particular trust,
partly because the value given to the retained interest in-
cluded not only income but also appreciation, and partly be-
cause of the investment options available to the trustee;
4. adverse selection; and
5. leverage benefit.
Each of these will be examined in turn.
A. The Interest Rate Problem
GRITs became attractive when interest rates for valuing life estates,
terms for years and remainder interests were changed from six per-
cent to ten percent for transfers after November 30, 1983.112 The rea-
son was that the increase in rates increased the value of a grantor's
retained term of years and, since few trust investments generated a
ten percent return, the grantor's retained interest was overvalued. 113
Clearly, using one interest rate to value terms of years, income inter-
ests, and remainder interests, regardless of changing interest rates
available in the market, artificially distorts their value. Congress rec-
ognized this problem and addressed it in 1988.114 Code section 7520
requires that actuarial tables used for valuing partial interests in prop-
erty be revised monthly to take account of changes in market interest
rates. 115 It should be noted that section 7520 was enacted entirely in-
dependent of Chapter 14 and its predecessor, Code section 2036(c).
Any concern about the tables' currency and reflection of interest rates
available in the market, therefore, was fully satisfied by the enactment
of section 7520 and should not have been a concern in 1990 when
section 2702 was enacted. 116 However, the enactment of section 7520
did not cure the effects of the high rate used for the table.117
112. F. Landson Boyle, Evaluating Split-Interest Valuation, 24 GA. L. REV. 1, 21 (1989).
113. PRACICAL DRAFnN Apr. 1991, at 2434 (Richard B. Covey ed.); Boyle, supra note 112,
at 21.
114. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act (TAMRA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 5031, 102 Stat. 3668-69 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7520 (1994)). The change is described
in Boyle, supra note 112, at 21-22.
115. Boyle, supra note 112, at 22. Section 7520 also requires the Internal Revenue Service to
change the tables at least every 10 years to reflect the most recent mortality tables. Id.
116. Gans, supra note 32, at 773, 794; Llewellyn, supra note 91, at 222.
117. The rate specified under section 7520 is quite high. Gans, supra note 32, at 773 n.22.
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B. Retention of Contingent Principal Interests
Another concern was that grantors of GRITs often retained certain
interests in the principal of the trusts. The most important of these
interests were:
1. the right to have the entire corpus of the estate payable to the
grantor's estate if the grantor died during the trust term;118
and
2. the retention of a testamentary power of appointment during
the term of the trust.119
Both of these interests could be valued and, if the grantor retained
one or both of these interests, the value of the gift was reduced by the
value of the retained interests.120
C. Incorrect Valuation of Retained Interests
This argument, which was perhaps the strongest argument support-
ing the enactment of section 2702, has two parts.
1. Use of the Tables Does Not Accurately Reflect Return on Any
Particular Trust
Clearly, Congress was concerned about the undervaluation of gifts
by the tables because of the differing investment vehicles available:
In addition, the committee is concerned about the undervaluation
of gifts valued pursuant to Treasury tables. Based on average rates
of return and life expectancy, those tables are seldom accurate in a
particular case, and therefore, may be the subject of adverse selec-
tion. Because the taxpayer decides what property to give, when to
give it, and often controls the return on the property, use of Treas-
ury tables undervalues the transferred interests in the aggregate,
more often than not.12 1
The Treasury Department thought that creators of GRITs were do-
ing exactly what the Senate Finance Committee suspected by contrib-
uting assets with great potential for growth but little current income
(or by suggesting that trustees invest the GRIT in such assets).' 22 The
Senate was searching for a way to more closely match the gift tax
118. SENATE EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra note 12, at S15680; PRACTICAL DRAFrING
Apr. 1991, at 2434 (Richard B. Covey ed.); Harrison, supra note 91, at 901-02; Lee, supra note
40, at 560-64.
119. PRACICAL DRAFTING Apr. 1991, at 2434 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
120. Id.
121. SENATE EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra note 12, at S15681.
122. Llewellyn, supra note 91, at 222; see also Hearings, supra note 12, at 42-44 (statement of
Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury); SENATE
EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra note 12, at S15680 ("Use of the Treasury tables is allowed even
when they do not accurately predict the actual rate of return from the property.").
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value of the retained interest to the actual income from the interest to
be paid to the grantor during the continuance of the trust.
2. Income vs. Appreciation
Although the Senate report does not refer to it, a number of com-
mentators have recognized that the tables contain an underlying as-
sumption which is questionable. The section 7520 tables divide the
value of property contributed to a trust by using an interest rate.123
By doing the valuation this way, the underlying assumption is that the
grantor will receive the value of his or her entire interest (as deter-
mined by the tables) through distributions of income over the life of
the trust.'2 4 If, however, the investments are chosen so that the in-
come is less than the table rate, some of the value of the grantor's
interest (as valued by the tables) is transferred to the remainderman
through growth in the corpus. 2 5 In short, appreciation in corpus ben-
efits the remainderman, whereas valuing the grantor's interest by per-
centage and mortality tables allocates such appreciation to the
grantor. This overstates the value of the grantor's retained interest,
understates the value of the gift, and reduces the amount of the taxa-
ble gift.
D. Adverse Selection
As pointed out by a number of commentators, one benefit of a
GRIT was the "rate benefit," that is, when the table rate exceeded the
rate on investments available to the trustee, the taxable gift was un-
dervalued because the grantor's retained interest (based on the tables)
123. The rate is 120% of the federal mid-term rate for the month in which the valuation falls.
I.R.C. § 7520(a)(2) (1994). However, the grantor may use the federal mid-term rate for either of
the two months preceding the month in which the trust is created. Id. § 7520(a).
124. See Louis S. Harrison, The Strategic Use of Lifetime Gifting Programs to Reduce Estate
Taxes in Light of Recent Congressional and Internal Revenue Service Antipathy Towards Transfer
Tax Reduction Devices, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 365, 371 n.32 (1991), stating that:
The trustee of a GRIT could decide to invest in high growth, low yield assets, thereby
transferring, in effect, more property to the remainderman than was assumed for gift
tax valuation purposes, while depriving the grantor of his or her assumed retained in-
come. For example, if the gift tax valuation discount rate was assumed to be 10.80%,
then the grantor was assumed to be receiving a 10.80% rate of return each year via his
or her income interest. If the trustee invested the GRIT in assets which yielded 6.80%
in income and 4% in growth each year, then 6.80% in income was returned to the
grantor while 4% in growth was transferred, free of gift tax, to the remainderman. This
arguably was abusive since the initial gift tax valuation assumed that the grantor would
be receiving income equal to 10.80% of the GRIT each year.
Id. at 371 n.32.
125. Id.; see also Boyle, supra note 112, at 15, 17 (discussing the accuracy of the Treasury
tables); Gans, supra note 32, at 766 (discussing GRIT-related investment strategies).
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was overvalued. 126 These commentators also noted that if the invest-
ments of the trust had a higher rate of return than the table rate, the
grantor's retained interest would be undervalued to the detriment of
the grantor.127 It has been argued that since the grantor could not
predict at the creation of the trust the rate of return the investments
would produce,128 approximately as many GRITs would benefit the
Treasury as would benefit the taxpayer. 129 This, in turn, means that
GRITs are not abusive. 130 This is particularly true if the trustee has
the power to reinvest the trust property.
The Senate Finance Committee' 3' and some commentators, 132 how-
ever, believed that a grantor would only create a GRIT where it was
very likely that the return realized by the GRIT would be less than the
table rate. 133 Therefore, adverse selection would turn the rate differ-
ential into an abuse.
E. Leverage Benefit
This benefit, mentioned only by one commentator, 134 is difficult to
describe briefly. To simplify, it is the extra appreciation generated by
a GRIT over an outright gift. For a GRIT to be comparable in value
to an outright gift, more must be transferred to the GRIT to convey
the same amount to the remainderman than is required for an outright
gift.135 The reason is that the grantor retains the income from the
GRIT for a term of years, whereas in an outright gift, the property is
given to the beneficiary immediately. The "leverage" benefit results
from the fact that the additional amount contributed to the GRIT is
available to be invested and appreciate. 36
This division of appreciation does not appear to have influenced the
Senate Finance Committee in formulating section 2702. In any event,
126. Gans, supra note 32, at 766-68; Harrison, supra note 91, at 898-99; see supra note 123;
supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
127. Gans, supra note 32, at 767-68; Harrison, supra note 91, at 898-99.
128. See supra note 127; Lee, supra note 40, at 556-57.
129. Gans, supra note 32, at 767-68; Harrison, supra note 91, at 898-99.
130. See supra note 129. Harrison is a particular proponent of this view.
131. SENATE EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra note 12, at S15680-81.
132. See, e.g., Gans, supra note 32, at 768-69, 772-73.
133. Id. at 772-73; Lee, supra note 40, at 565.
134. Gans, supra note 32, at 784-87.
135. Id. at 785.
136. Id. at 786. Gans compares a $100 GRIT with the equivalent outright gift ($90.90 for a
one year GRIT at a 10% table rate, assuming a 10% rate was available in the market). The
donee of the outright gift would have $100 at the end of the year. The GRIT would have $110.
Of the $10 in GRIT appreciation, $9.09 would have been generated by a comparable outright
gift of $90.90. The remaining $0.91 of appreciation results from the fact that $100 of corpus is
appreciating, rather than $90.90. Id. at 785-87.
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it is minimal as compared to appreciation caused by investment selec-
tion and will not be further considered here.
V. WERE GRITS AND JOINT PURCHASES ABUSIvE?
The discussion of the abuses that were perceived to exist in GRITs
and joint purchases in Part IV leads readily to several questions.
1. Why did Congress adopt the solution embodied in section
2702?
2. Does section 2702 work, that is, does it rectify the abuses per-
ceived in GRITs and joint purchases?
3. What are the costs (in complexity, adjustments, and other
matters) of the regime imposed by section 2702?
4. Are there other, perhaps less intrusive alternatives available
to cure the problems seen by commentators and Congress in
GRITs and joint purchases? Alternatively, if Congress char-
acterized the problems incorrectly, is there a different and
better structural change to deal with the problem?
The remainder of this Article considers these questions in the order
just stated. However, it is worthwhile to pause to consider briefly
whether GRITs and joint purchases were abusive at all. In one sense,
the enactment of Code section 2702 rendered this question moot. In a
broader sense, however, no statute is ever safe from repeal.137 If, on
analysis, it is found that the techniques are not abusive, or that only
minor abuses are present in the techniques, narrower solutions can be
crafted which do not disrupt the system to the extent section 2702
does. 138
A. The GRIT
It has been argued that several of the concerns identified previ-
ously139 are not abusive. 140 The rate benefit, that is, the taxes saved if
the table rate is greater than the average rate of return on invest-
ments, is minimal.14' This is so because only the spread between the
table rate and the actual return is saved. 142 In addition, any savings
are somewhat offset due to the possibility of transfer tax losses.143
Similarly, any variance of the value of the grantor's retained interest
resulting from the trust investments growing at a greater rate than the
137. Indeed, section 2036(c), the predecessor of section 2702, was itself repealed. See supra
note 3.
138. See discussion infra Part VIII.
139. See discussion supra Part IV.
140. Harrison, supra note 91, at 898-99.
141. Id. at 898-900.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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table rate is minimal. 144 And any possible abuse resulting from the
fact that the table rate is not adjusted frequently to take account of
changing market conditions was cured by the enactment of section
7520.145 Leverage benefit, as previously noted, is minimal in any
event.146
There appears to be a disagreement over whether adverse selection
exists. 147 Even those arguing that adverse selection exists cite no stud-
ies indicating its existence. The author is aware of no study demon-
strating adverse selection by grantors in creating GRITs, nor even any
studies showing that a large percentage of GRITs underperform the
table rate. Therefore, any argument based on adverse selection re-
mains unproven.
But even assuming a few taxpayers gain some advantages from rate
benefit, adverse selection and leverage benefits, there is an additional
factor involved in evaluating whether such advantages are abusive.
That factor is that no table will accurately value the grantor's retained
interest in any particular trust. Tables are used as convenient devices
to value interests in many trusts with the expectation that the experi-
ence in many trusts will average out: some favoring the taxpayer and
some favoring the government. To argue, as the Senate report does,
that the table rates are inaccurate in most cases, 148 misses the point
that no table can correctly value the retained interest in an individual
case. A table is created to provide an administratively workable and
convenient rule for many cases. This is necessitated by the fact that
the gift of the remainder interest is complete when made 149 and the
remainder interest must be valued and taxed at that time, prior to any
knowledge of the trust's investment experience. In addition, as Judge
Friendly has stated, "the United States is in business with enough dif-
ferent taxpayers so that the law of averages has ample opportunity to
work."'150 Even assuming adverse selection may exist, it is inequitable
for the government to pick and choose cases in which to use the ta-
bles. It is certainly questionable tax policy for Congress to outlaw the
use of the tables in cases where their use may be advantageous to
144. Id.
145. Gans, supra note 32, at 773.
146. See discussion supra Part IV.E.
147. Compare Gans, supra note 32, at 768-73, and SENATE EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra
note 12, at S15680-81, with Harrison, supra note 91, at 898-900.
148. SENATE EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra note 12, at S15681.
149. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a) (1958).
150. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 552 (2d Cir. 1962).
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taxpayers but mandate their use when the tables work to the govern-
ment's advantage.' 5'
Lastly, another possible disadvantage of the GRIT should be noted.
The true comparison of the GRIT should be with the outright gift. 152
A grantor making an outright gift has no risk that the appreciation of
the property will be subject to transfer tax. 153 However, if the grantor
dies during the term of the GRIT, the value of the trust on the date of
the grantor's death will be included in the grantor's gross estate and
subject to the estate tax.' 54 Therefore, there was a risk of increased
transfer taxation associated with the creation of a GRIT as contrasted
with the making of an outright gift.
The considerations discussed appear to demonstrate that these al-
leged abuses of the GRIT (rate benefit, leverage benefit and adverse
selection) were either minimal or non-abusive. The remaining advan-
tages of a GRIT, however, were clearly abusive. Reducing the value
of the gift by valuing a reversionary interest or a power of appoint-
ment retained by the grantor, even though no additional property was
distributed to the grantor, clearly gave the GRIT advantages over an
outright gift.' 55 The fact that the tables ignored appreciation clearly
overvalued the grantor's retained interest and permitted a transfer of
property to the remainderman without being subject to any transfer
tax. 56 And the fact that Code section 7520 set the table rate at a
higher rate than generally available for trust investments can result in
overvaluing the grantor's retained interest. 57
That some tax savings were available to grantors of GRITs does not
indicate that the enactment of Code section 2702 was either a rational
response to the problems created by the GRIT or that the theory un-
derlying section 2702 was correct. The answer to these questions de-
pends on a comparison of the benefits of section 2702 with the
difficulties caused by its provisions and an examination of whether
limited remedies or developing case law, or a combination thereof,
151. Hearings, supra note 12, at 64-65 (statement of John A. Wallace, Director, A.B.A. Pro-
bate & Trust Division).
152. See generally Gans, supra note 32 (weighing the risks and benefits of a GRIT versus a
comparable outright gift).
153. An outright gift is complete when made. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (as amended in
1983). Only in very rare instances, not relevant to this Article, is the appreciation from the date
of gift to the date of the grantor's death taxed by inclusion of the value of the trust in the
grantor's gross estate. See I.R.C. § 2035 (1994) (discussing gifts made within three years of dece-
dent's death); id. § 2041 (providing rules for general powers of appointment).
154. I.R.C. § 2036(a).
155. Gans, supra note 32, at 787-91; Harrison, supra note 91, at 901-02.
156. Harrison, supra note 91, at 900-01.
157. Gans, supra note 32, at 792-95.
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could have solved these problems. These examinations will be under-
taken shortly.158
B. Joint Purchase
If there were areas of abuse involved in the creation of a GRIT, it is
difficult to find any such abuse in the joint purchase. In its simplest
form, the joint purchase involves the purchase of a life income interest
in an asset by an older generation member of a family (for instance, a
parent) and the purchase of the remainder interest by a younger gen-
eration member of the same family (for instance, a child). There is no
gift involved because the parent contributes consideration equal to the
value of the life income interest and the child contributes the value of
the remainder. The concern appeared to be that the appreciation be-
tween the date of purchase and the date of death was not subject to a
transfer tax (because a life income interest is not included in the gross
estate), 159 although that concern was not very clearly expressed. 60
This treatment, however, merely appears to be a result of the Code's
allowance of split ownership of temporal interests in property. No
abuse is evident. If the value of either interest in property at the time
of purchase exceeds the consideration paid by the purchaser, a taxable
gift occurs. 161 Moreover, if the child's consideration comes from
money or property previously given to the child by the parent, a gift
tax has presumably been paid on the gift.162 Even if an irrevocable
trust for the child purchases the remainder interest, the creation of the
trust presumably generated a gift tax.163 A comparable example
would be to say that the creation of a tenancy-in-common is an abuse
because the appreciation of the surviving co-tenant's share is not in-
cluded in the estate of the first co-tenant to die. If the creation of
temporal interests in property is allowed, it is hard to see a joint
purchase as abusive.' 64
158. See discussion infra Parts VII, VIII.
159. I.R.C. § 2033.
160. SENATE EXPLANATORY MATERIAL, supra note 12, at S15680-81.
161. Id.
162. I.R.C. § 2501.
163. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (as amended in 1983).
164. See discussion infra Part VIII.B (arguing that the problem perceived by Congress in the
GRIT and the joint purchase really involves the problem of recognizing the creation of temporal
interests in property for tax purposes). That is, these problems are not valuation problems at all,
but structural problems which can be corrected only by a structural solution.
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VI. DOES SECTION 2702 WORK? HE'S BACK!
A. GRITs and Joint Purchases
The purpose of Congress in enacting Code section 2702 was to pre-
vent the type of estate planning techniques exemplified by the GRIT
and the joint purchase. 165 It is important to note, however, that the
legislative history reveals that Congress was concerned not only with
GRITs and joint purchases, but more generally with the use of trusts
and term interests to cause tax avoidance. 166 It is quite clear that sec-
tion 2702 effectively foreclosed the GRIT and the joint purchase as
tax avoidance devices.' 67 The section eliminated two major transfer
tax savings aspects of the GRIT. First, the value of the taxable trans-
fer is no longer reduced by the value of the grantor's retained inter-
est.168 Therefore, the value of the taxable gift is the full value of the
transferred property. Second, the grantor can no longer indirectly
transfer property to the remainder beneficiaries by investing solely in
high growth assets and keeping income to a minimum. 69 Because the
only retained interests given value by section 2702 are annuity and
unitrust interests, 70 which are based either on an absolute dollar fig-
ure or a percentage of the original or yearly trust assets,' 7 ' if the in-
come is less than the required payout, the remainder must be paid
from principal.
As to the joint purchase, section 2702 treats it as a purchase of the
entire property by the member of the older generation (the parent)
followed by a transfer of the remainder interest to the member of the
younger generation (the child). 172 Since the transfer of the remainder
interest to the child is a transfer with a retained interest subject to
section 2702173 and the parent's life interest or term of years is not a
qualified interest, 74 the parent's retained interest is valued at zero. 175
165. See discussion supra Parts II, IV.
166. See discussion supra Part IV.
167. Gans, supra note 32, at 792-93.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See I.R.C. § 2702(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(2) (1994).
171. A qualified annuity interest can be either a dollar amount or a fixed percentage of the
initial fair market value of the trust. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B) (as amended in
1995). A qualified unitrust interest is a fixed percentage of the net fair market value of the trust
assets determined annually. Id. § 25.2702-3(c)(1) (as amended in 1995).
172. I.R.C. § 2702(c)(2).
173. Id. § 2702(a)(1).
174. It is not a qualified interest because it is not an annuity or unitrust interest. Id.
§ 2702(a)(2).
175. Id.
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The result is a taxable gift of the full value of the property (less any
consideration furnished by the child).
B. Beating Section 2702: GRATs and High Rates of Return
However, in order to be effective, section 2702 must not only pre-
vent tax avoidance by eliminating the advantages of the GRIT and
joint purchase, it must also prevent other manipulation by grantors
which result in tax avoidance. The evidence so far is that section 2702
has been unsuccessful in this part of its task. A number of authors
have shown that when the trust's rate of return exceeds the section
7520 table rate used to value the retained term of years, a tax savings
is achieved by transferring more property to the remainder benefi-
ciaries than was subject to transfer tax on the date of the gift.176 This
transfer tax savings is achieved by producing more income than the
tables predict and allocate to the grantor's retained interest. Since, at
least in a Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT), the amount of
payment to the grantor is fixed, the additional income passes to the
remainder beneficiaries with no transfer tax (assuming the grantor
outlives the GRAT term). 177 Indeed, one author calls the GRAT "a
virtually risk-free and an almost gift-tax-free method of shifting future
income and appreciation to another"' 78 and illustrates this with a de-
tailed and thorough example. 179
C. Beating Section 2702: Changing the Assets
It has been noted that since the retained interest in a GRAT is
either a fixed dollar amount or a fixed percentage of the original trust
176. Gans, supra note 32, at 802; Steven A. Horowitz, MIGRATS-" Are Better Than Your
GRATs Despite New Section 7520 Regulations, 74 TAXES 299, 300 (1996); Llewellyn, supra note
91, at 253-54, 285; McCaffrey, supra note 91, at 47. A GRAT is preferred over a GRUT for this
purpose because in a GRAT, appreciation in the value of the trust assets will not increase the
payment to the grantor, enabling a greater amount of property to be transferred tax-free to the
remainder beneficiaries. Gans, supra note 32, at 802.
177. Gans, supra note 32, at 802. Some authorities recommend a "zeroed out GRAT," a
GRAT in which the present value of the grantor's retained annuity interest, discounted by the
applicable section 7520 interest rate, is equal to or greater than the value of the property trans-
ferred to the trust. Horowitz, supra note 176, at 300. In such a case, there is no taxable gift and
any rate of return produced by the trust in excess of the section 7520 rate used, either in income
or appreciation, is transferred totally tax-free to the remainder beneficiaries. Id. The author
does note some I.R.S. resistance to this technique and some uncertainty as to its effectiveness.
Id.; see also Gans, supra note 32, at 833-34, 911 (stating that the zero-value rule for GRATs gives
them a comparable advantage over outright gifts); McCaffrey, supra note 91, at 58-62 (discussing
several possible approaches to structuring a GRAT).
178. McCaffrey, supra note 91, at 59.
179. Id. at 60-62.
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assets,180 it is never affected by investment performance. However, a
change in the trust assets after the creation of a GRAT, perhaps due
to a change in economic conditions, resulting in higher yielding assets,
could result in transferring property tax-free to remainder
beneficiaries. 181
D. Beating Section 2702: Income Tax Effects
If the income tax on the trust is paid by the grantor under the gran-
tor trust rules or under a provision of the governing trust instru-
ment,182 the GRAT is advantageous when compared to an outright
gift even when the rate of return on the GRAT investments is less
than the table rate. 8 3 The reason is that the trust will not pay the
income tax on its income'84 and the payment of income tax by the
grantor is not a taxable gift.' 85 As a result, property is transferred to
the remainder beneficiaries tax-free. 186
E. Estate Tax Inclusion
Based on prior rulings concerning charitable trusts, 87 most com-
mentators believed that only a portion of a GRAT or GRUT would
be included in a grantor's gross estate if the grantor died during the
trust term. 188 If this position ultimately proves correct, a GRAT will
have an advantage over some other techniques in that only a portion
of the appreciation in the property between the date of creation of the
GRAT and the grantor's date of death will be included in the gran-
tor's gross estate.189
180. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(A), (B) (as amended in 1995).
181. Martha W. Jordan, Sales of Remainder Interests: Reconciling Gradow v. United States
and Section 2702, 14 VA. TAX REv. 671, 708 (1995).
182. See I.R.C. §§ 671-677 (providing the income tax provisions for trusts). Section 677 will
usually be the applicable provision, since it deals with income for the benefit of the grantor.
183. Gans, supra note 32, at 828; LUewellyn, supra note 91, at 253-54.
184. See supra note 183.
185. Gans, supra note 32, at 828-29.
186. Id. at 829. Of course, in the case of an outright gift, the donee bears the burden of
income taxes on the income earned by the gifted property. Id.
187. Rev. Rul. 82-105, 1982-1 C.B. 133-34; Rev. Rul. 76-273, 1976-2 C.B. 268-69.
188. PRACnCAL DRAFNG Oct. 1993, at 3377-79 (Richard B. Covey ed.); PRACTICAL DRAFr-
No July 1994, at 3741 (Richard B. Covey ed.); Gans, supra note 32, at 878-911; McCaffrey, supra
note 91, at 55-56; Olsen, supra note 91, at 69-73.
189. It should be noted that there are indications that, at least in the case of a zeroed-out
GRAT, the entire trust will be included in the gross estate if the grantor dies during the trust
term under section 2039. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-51-056 (Sept. 26, 1994). Several authors have criti-
cized the I.R.S.'s reasoning in this ruling. See David R. Hodgman & Debra L. Stetter, Analyzing
GRATs: Does the Emperor Have any Clothes?, 134 TR. & EsT. 41, 47 (1995); Steven A.
Horowitz, Succession Planning for the Family Business Enterprise: Sales, GRATs and Donative
Transfers-the Comparative Advantages, 74 TAXES 428, 436 (1996).
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F The Personal Residence Exception
Section 2702 contains an exception to its "zero value rule" for re-
tained interests for transfers of personal residences in trust where the
grantor holds a term or life interest in the trust.190 This means that a
grantor can continue to create a GRIT with the grantor's personal
residence. The regulations have expanded the requirements for a per-
sonal residence trust into two types: the Personal Residence Trust
(PRT) and the Qualified Personal Residence Trust (QPRT).' 9'
Basically, a PRT is an irrevocable trust created with a personal resi-
dence of the grantor as the trust property, with the grantor retaining a
term of years in the trust.192 The regulations provide detailed rules
regarding what constitutes a personal residence and what other prop-
erty may be in the trust. 93 Significant restrictions on the PRT exist. 94
The QPRT is much more flexible and popular than the PRT.195 It
may hold a personal residence, improvements and limited amounts of
cash.196 The grantor's term interest can be transferred by gift.197 If
the trust assets are disposed of, the trust agreement must specify
either outright distribution to the term holder, conversion of the trust
into a GRAT, or give the trustee power to select one of the two
choices. 98 There are a vast number of governing instrument require-
ments which greatly complicate the trust. 99
Of course, even with the complications and limits imposed by the
mandatory requirements, the availability of the QPRT creates a major
flaw in the scheme of section 2702. One commentator has referred to
PRTs and QPRTs as providing an "extraordinary opportunity" for tax
190. I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii) (1994).
191. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5 (1992).
192. Catherine Veihmeyer Hughes, The Qualified Personal Residence Trust ("QPRT"), Out-
line for Presentation at a Meeting of the Estate and Gift Tax Committee, Section of Taxation,
A.B.A. (August 4, 1995) (outline on file with the DePaul Law Review).
193. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(b)(2)(i), (ii) (1992); see PRACTICAL DRAFTING Oct. 1993, at 3357-
61 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
194. PRACrICAL DRATNG Oct. 1993, at 3361-62 (Richard B. Covey ed.). For example, the
residence cannot be sold or transferred by the trust. Id. There appear to be a number of provi-
sions which must be included in the trust instrument. Id.; see infra note 217. Other than the
personal residence, only proceeds payable as a result of damages to, or destruction or involun-
tary conversion of the residence, I.R.C. § 1033; Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(b)(3) (1992), and insur-
ance policies on the residence, PRACTICAL DRAMrNG Oct. 1993, at 3357-61 (Richard B. Covey
ed.), may be held in the PRT.
195. PRACTICAL DRAFING Oct. 1993, at 3362 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
196. Hughes, supra note 192, at 5.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 7.
199. PRACTICAL DRAFTING Oct. 1993, at 3362-68 (Richard B. Covey ed.); Hughes, supra note
192, at 4-9; see infra note 217.
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savings.200 The two major tax advantages offered by the availability of
the QPRT are: (i) if the grantor survives the term, any future appreci-
ation on the personal residence or residences is removed from the
grantor's estate at no transfer tax cost;201 and (ii) the taxable gift is not
the full value of the property, but is reduced by the value of the grin-
tor's retained interest.
Why did Congress create this huge loophole in the attack on valua-
tion abuses? Primarily, it appears that Congress believed that the
PRT could not be abusive.20 2 A second reason may be linked to the
origin of the section 2702 rules. It is quite clear that Congress based
section 2702 on the charitable deduction rules enacted in 1969.203 The
charitable deduction rules allow a charitable deduction for transfers of
remainder interests in a personal residence or a farm.2°4 When this
exception to the annuity trust and unitrust requirements for split in-
terest trusts for a charitable deduction was enacted, Congress appar-
ently believed that this situation was not subject to valuation abuse.20 5
Congress felt the same way about reserved terms of years in personal
residences.20 6 It may be that Congress believed that any effect of the
exception would be de minimis because a personal residence does not
usually comprise a large fraction of a person's wealth, thus limiting
any potential for abuse.207 It should also be noted that the apprecia-
tion in personal residences being limited,20 8 the possibility of investing
in high growth, low income assets not being present,209 the detrimen-
tal loss of the step-up in basis which would occur if the personal resi-
dence is owned until death,210 and the transactional costs of creating
and administering QPRTs, support the idea that QPRTs are not abu-
sive.211 Despite the force of these arguments, the attention paid by
200. Llewellyn, supra note 91, at 216; see also Cass & Campbell, supra note 103, at 512 (assert-
ing that the GRAT is a useful planning technique, although not as advantageous as a GRIT).
201. Hughes, supra note 192, at 1.
202. Gans, supra note 32, at 806-10.
203. Id.; see Cass & Campbell, supra note 103, at 511; Horowitz, supra note 176, at 305; Llew-
ellyn, supra note 91, at 225; Jeffrey N. Pennell, Section 2036(c) Repealed and Replaced with
Chapter 14, 2 PROB. PRAC. REP. 1, 5 (Dec. 1990); Plaine & Schneider, supra note 91, at 147.
204. I.R.C. §§ 2055(e)(2), (3)(1)(i), 2522(c)(2) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(e)(2)(ii) (as
amended in 1994); Id. § 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1995).
205. S. REP. No. 91-552, at 88 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2116-18, and in
1969-3 C.B. 479-80; see Estate of Blackford v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1246, 1250 (1981).
206. Harrison, supra note 91, at 923-24.
207. Id.; Gans, supra note 32, at 806.
208. Gans, supra note 32, at 807.
209. Harrison, supra note 91, at 923-24.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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commentators to QPRTs212 and the number of rulings on them appear
to refute these contentions. 213 It appears that many tax and estate
planning lawyers and their clients believe that QPRTs offer enough
substantial tax advantages to employ them.
G. Summary
Although section 2702 makes GRITs and joint purchases practically
useless, the GRAT and to a lesser extent the GRUT, continue to offer
tax savings opportunities in many situations. Moreover, the availabil-
ity of PRTs and QPRTs provide additional opportunities for tax plan-
ning. Clearly, if the purpose of section 2702 was to close down the use
of term interests in trusts as estate freezes, the section has failed to do
SO.
VII. THE PRICE OF SECTION 2702: JASON'S TRIUMPH
The analysis of section 2702 is not complete after determining
whether the section accomplished its purposes. From the previous
discussion, it is clear that section 2702 accomplished part, though not
all, of its purpose. But, to competently evaluate the wisdom of the
section, the cost of the accomplishment must also be compared with
the importance of the purpose to be achieved.
A. Complexity
As previously mentioned, the remedy employed by section 2702
was copied from the revision of the charitable deduction in 1969.214
The revision of the charitable deduction came with enormous com-
plexity.215 Indeed, the provisions regarding charitable remainder
212. See supra notes 200-01.
213. As of July 23, 1996, QPRTs or PRTs were involved in 17 of 35 rulings listed in the
Cumulative Index, and the latest additions thereto, of the CCH Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Reporter under section 2702. Cumulative Index for Reports 1-310, 3 Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep.
(CCH) 15,523-580 (June 6, 1995); Latest Additions to Cumulative Index for Reports 311-369, 3
Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (CCH) 15,505-520 (July 23, 1996).
214. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
215. The complexity came in the form of mandatory governing instrument requirements im-
posed primarily by regulations. An extensive discussion of these requirements may be found in
the following BNA Tax Management Portfolios: BornNIE S. BRIER & NANCY J. KNAUER, Chari-
table Income Trusts, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 442-2d (1993); BONNIE S. BRIER & NANCY J. KNAUER,
Charitable Remainder Trusts and Pooled Income Funds, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 435-2d (1992).
What follows is a partial list of governing instrument requirements for the various types of
charitable split interest trusts. This list is taken primarily from Zoe M. Hicks, Charitable Giving
Strategies, Outline for Presentation at a Meeting of the Estate and Gift Tax Committee, Section
of Taxation, A.B.A. (February 15, 1992) (outline on file with the DePaul Law Review).
1. Mandatory Provisions for Charitable Remainder Annuity Trusts (CRAT) and Charitable
Remainder Unitrusts (CRUT)
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trusts were deemed to be so complex that the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice published approved forms for these trusts.2 16
Given the history of section 2702, it is not surprising that, as in the
charitable deduction area, many complex and mandatory governing
instrument requirements were imposed.2 17 Of course, this makes cre-
a. Must provide for payment to a noncharitable beneficiary of a dollar amount or a fixed
percentage of at least five percent of the initial fair market value (CRAT) or of a fixed
percentage of at least five percent of the net fair market value of the property valued
annually (CRUT). I.R.C. § 664(d)(2)(A), (d)(3) (1994).
b. Only the annuity or unitrust amount may be paid to the noncharitable beneficiary. Id.
§ 1.664-2(a)(4) (as amended in 1994); id. § 1.664-3(a)(4) (1972).
c. The recipient must be a named person or persons who are alive when the trust is
created. Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(a)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1994); id. § 1.664-3(a)(3)(ii)
(1972).
d. The term of the annuity or unitrust must be either the life or lives of the noncharitable
beneficiary or a term not exceeding 20 years. I.R.C. §§ 664(d)(1)(A), 2(A).
e. The payment period begins on the trust's creation. Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(a)(5)(i) (as
amended in 1994); id. § 1.664-3(a)(5)(i) (1972).
f. At the end of the term, the remainder must be paid to the charity or continued in trust
for a charitable use. I.R.C. § 664(d)(1)(C), (2)(C).
g. Alternative charitable remaindermen must be named. Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(a)(6)(iv)
(as amended in 1994); id. § 1.664-3(a)(6)(iv) (1972).
h. The annuity or unitrust amount must be prorated for any year less than 12 months. Id.
§ 1.664-2(a)(1)(iv) (as amended in 1994); id. § 1.664-3(a)(1)(v) (1972).
i. Additional contributions to an annuity trust must be prohibited. If additional
contributions to a unitrust are permitted, a formula must be stated to compute the
unitrust amount. Id. § 1.664-2(b) (as amended in 1994); id. § 1.664-3(b)(1)-(2) (1972).
j. Correction must be made for incorrect payments. Id. § 1.664-2(a)(1)(iii) (as amended
in 1994); id. § 1.664-3(a)(1)(iii) (1972).
k. The trustee must be permitted to invest to obtain a reasonable amount of income. Id.
§ 1.664-1(a)(3) (as amended in 1994).
1. Estate taxes may not be paid from the trust. Rev. Rul. 82-128, 1982-2 C.B. 71.
m. In a short taxable year, the valuation of the trust assets must be made on the last date of
that year. Rev. Rul. 82-165, 1982-2 C.B. 117.
n. Private foundation restrictions should be imposed on the trustee. Rev. Rul. 72-395,
1972-2 C.B. 340.
2. Requirements for Charitable Lead Annuity Trusts (CLAT) and Charitable Lead Unitrusts
(CLUT)
a. Must provide for a guaranteed annuity interest or guaranteed unitrust interest to
charitable organizations. These interests are determined in the same manner as
charitable remainder trusts. I.R.C. §§ 2522(c)(2), 2055(e)(2).
b. Must be established for a specific term of years or for the life of one or more persons
living at the trust's creation or a combination thereof. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
6(c)(2)(i)(A), (ii)(A) (as amended in 1994); id. § 20.2055-2(e)(2)(v)(a), (vi)(a) (as
amended in 1994); id. § 25.2522(c)-3(c)(2)(v)(a), (vi)(a) (as amended in 1994).
c. Must specifically prohibit violation of the private foundation rules. I.R.C.
§§ 4947(a)(2), 508(e).
216. Rev. Proc. 90-32, 1990-1 C.B. 546; Rev. Proc. 90-31, 1990-1 C.B. 539; Rev. Proc. 90-30,
1990-1 C.B. 534; Rev. Proc. 89-21, 1989-1 C.B. 842; Rev. Proc. 89-20, 1989-1 C.B. 841.
217. McCaffrey, supra note 91, at 49-52; Plaine & Schneider, supra note 91, at 149. Some of
the governing instrument requirements of the GRAT, GRUT, PRT and QPRT are as follows:
1. GRAT
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a. The annuity interest must be irrevocable. The fixed amount may be a stated dollar
amount or a fraction or percentage of the initial fair market value. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2702-3(b)(1)(i), (ii)(A)-(B) (as amended in 1995).
b. The annuity must be paid at least annually. d. § 25.2702-3(b)(ii)(A), (B) (as amended
in 1995).
c. If the annuity is stated as a fraction or percentage, the governing instrument must
contain provisions meeting the requirements of Treasury Regulation section 1.664-
2(a)(1)(iii) (as amended in 1994) on incorrect determination of the fair market value of
the trust property. Id. § 25.2702-3(b)(2) (as amended in 1995).
d. The rules of Treasury Regulation section 1.664-2(a)(1)(iv) (as amended in 1994) relating
to computation for short taxable years must be met in the governing instrument. Id.
§ 25.2702-3(b)(B) (as amended in 1995).
e. Additional contributions are prohibited. This is a governing instrument requirement.
Id. § 25.2702-3(b)(4) (as amended in 1995).
f. No distributions to anyone other than the holder of the qualified annuity are permitted.
This is a governing instrument requirement. Id. § 25.2702-3(d)(2) (as amended in 1995).
g. The term must be for the life of the term holder, for a term of years, or for the shorter
of the two. This is a governing instrument requirement. Id. § 25.2702-3(d)(3) (as
amended in 1995).
h. Commutation of the term holder's interest must be prohibited by the governing
instrument. Id. § 25.2702-3(d)(4) (as amended in 1995).
2. GRUT
a. Basically, all the above requirements of the GRAT are applicable to the GRUT, except
that the unitrust interest is a fixed fraction or percentage of the net fair market value of
the trust determined annually. Id. § 25.2702-3(c), (d) (as amended in 1995).
b. Additional contributions to a GRUT are not prohibited. Id.
3. PRT
a. A grantor can create only two such trusts. Id. § 25.2702-5(a) (as amended in 1992).
b. Only personal residence and qualified proceeds can be held in the trust. This is a
governing instrument requirement. Id. § 25.2702-5(b) (as amended in 1992).
c. The primary use of the personal residence must be as a residence of the term holder.
Id. § 25.2702-5(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1992).
d. A personal residence must be either the principal residence of the term holder under
Code section 1034, one other residence of the term holder under Code section
280A(d)(2) or an undivided fractional interest in either type of residence. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2702-5(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 1992).
e. The only other property allowed in the trust is proceeds from damage, destruction or
involuntary conversion of the trust residence. The proceeds must be reinvested in a
personal residence within two years of receipt. The latter is a governing instrument
requirement. Id. § 25.2702-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1992).
4. QPRT
a. Requirement d of a PRT, supra, must be met. Id. § 25.2702-5(c)(2)(i) (as amended in
1992).
b. Requirement c of a PRT must be met. Id. § 25.2702-5(c)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1992).
c. The income from the trust must be distributed to the term holder at least annually and
distributions to anyone else during the trust term must be prohibited. These are
governing instrument requirements. Id. § 25.2702-5(c)(3), (4) (as amended in 1992).
d. The trust must be prohibited from holding any property other than one personal
residence of the term holder, cash for trust expenses incurred or reasonably expected to
be incurred within six months of the addition, for improvements to the residence to be
paid within six months of the addition, for the purchase of the initial residence if there is
a contract to purchase (within three months of the addition), and to purchase another
residence, with the same limit as for initial purchase. Id. § 25.2702-5(c)(5) (as amended
in 1992).
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ating these trusts far more complex for the practitioner than creating a
GRIT prior to 1990. As one leading practitioner put it: "Experience
with the complex governing instrument requirements for charitable
remainder trusts has shown that technical and not-so-technical mis-
takes are bound to be made in attempting to comply with these re-
quirements. It would therefore be desirable to avoid uncertainty
and unnecessary litigation by eliminating any unnecessary
requirements." 218
Clearly, the complexity of GRATs, GRUTs and QPRTs will cause
problems for practitioners.
B. Artificiality of the System
A problem with section 2702 is that it makes this portion of the
transfer tax system very artificial. It does so by falsely characterizing
what it is doing. The section 2702 zero value rule is supposedly
"[s]olely for purposes of determining whether a transfer of an interest
in trust to (or for the benefit of) a member of the transferor's family is
a gift (and the value of such transfer). '219 The rule appears to be
solely one of valuation and applies only for the limited purpose stated.
e. If cash can be held in the trust, any excess amounts, determined quarterly, must be paid
to the term holder. Also, at termination, any unused cash must be paid to the term
holder within 30 days of termination. These are governing instrument requirements.
Id. § 25.2702-5(c)(5)(ii)(B) (as amended in 1992).
f. The trust may hold improvements to the residence, sale proceeds (in a separate
account), insurance on the residence, and insurance proceeds in a separate account. Id.
§ 25.2702-5(c)(ii)(2)(B)-(D) (as amended in 1992).
g. Commutation of the term holder's interest is prohibited. This is a governing instrument
requirement. Id. § 25.2702-5(c)(6) (as amended in 1992).
h. If the personal residence ceases to be so used or is sold (if no proceeds can be held), the
trust ceases to be a QPRT. This is a governing instrument requirement. Id. § 25.2702-
5(c)(7) (as amended in 1992). Additional governing instrument requirements are
mandated if the personal residence is sold and the trust is permitted to hold proceeds of
sale. Id. Similar requirements are imposed for insurance proceeds. Id. § 25.2702-
5(c)(7)(B) (as amended in 1992).
i. On ceasing to be a QPRT, the trust must either distribute the assets, be converted to a
GRAT or give the trustee discretion to choose one of the alternatives. This is a
governing instrument requirement. Id. § 25.2702-5(c)(8) (as amended in 1992). A
number of governing instrument requirements, including compliance with all the
mandatory provisions of Treasury Regulation section 25.2702-3 (as amended in 1995), is
required if conversion to a GRAT is the chosen alternative. Id. § 25.2702-5(c)(8)(ii) (as
amended in 1992).
j. The grantor must be prohibited from purchasing the residence from the trust. This is a
governing instrument requirement for QPRTs created after May 16, 1996. Prop. Treas.
Reg. PS-4-96, 1996-18 C.B. 874.
218. Pam H. Schneider, Proposed Regulations Under Sections 2701, 2702 and 2703, Presenta-
tion before the I.R.S. on behalf of the A.B.A. 17 (Sept. 20, 1991) (on file with the DePaul Law
Review).
219. I.R.C. § 2702(a)(1) (1994).
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However, the rule really states that for gift tax purposes, in any trans-
fer in trust for the benefit of the grantor's family where the grantor
retains an interest, that retained interest is treated as if it did not exist.
In other words, under section 2702, a transfer by the transferor to the
transferor is a gift.220
Such a rule, of course, flies in the face of both normal understand-
ing and previous tax rules.22' If the donor retains an interest (such as
a life income interest or the income for a term of years) in a trust, the
normal understanding is that the gift is only of the portion of the prop-
erty which is transferred.222 The gift tax rule had previously con-
formed to this common understanding.22 3 Section 2702, despite its
stated limits, effectively reverses this rule for transfers in trust under
which the grantor retains an interest and other interests are given to
family members. By valuing the grantor's retained interest as zero for
gift tax purposes, the Code is effectively ruling that the grantor's re-
tained interest is a gift and is part of the taxable transfer. By retaining
an interest, the grantor has effectively made a taxable gift to himself.
Of course, such a rule is extremely artificial. And, like most artifi-
cial rules, it affects matters beyond the rule's stated limits. For exam-
ple, any income paid to the grantor during the term of the grantor's
retained interest (and not spent during the grantor's lifetime) is in-
cluded in the grantor's gross estate under section 2033.224 This income
is actually taxed twice, because the present value of the retained in-
come interest is subject to gift tax at the time of the creation of the
trust under section 2702.225
C. Adjustments Required for Future Gifts and Estate Tax
Double taxation of the income paid to the grantor is not the only
problem resulting from the artificiality of section 2702. For example,
what happens if some time after the creation of the trust, the grantor
220. This is the effect of valuing the transferor's retained interest at zero. The effect, of
course, is that the entire value of the transferred property is treated as a taxable gift. Thus, by
valuing the grantor's retained interest at zero, the fact that a person cannot give property to
himself is ignored.
221. Under previous tax law, a retained interest by the transferor was treated as an incom-
plete gift. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958).
222. Otherwise put, the value of the property less the value of the interest retained by the
grantor.
223. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958).
224. I.R.C. § 2033.
225. The income interest is one of the components of the property and is a part of its value at
the time of the creation of the trust. By valuing this interest at zero, section 2702 requires that
gift tax be paid on this portion of the trust property's value. To the extent not spent, section 2033
taxes this value again as part of the decedent's gross estate. Jordan, supra note 181, at 707 n.168.
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gives away all or part of his retained interest? Since this interest has
effectively already been subject to the gift tax at the creation of the
trust, taxing it again would be double taxation. A complicated regula-
tion was required to rectify this problem.226 Similarly, the problem of
an increase in the decedent's gross estate resulting from a zero valua-
tion needed to be addressed by regulations. 227 These issues arise only
because of the artificial system imposed by section 2702, and the ad-
justments necessitated by such issues further complicate the transfer
tax system.
D. Early Payments of Transfer Taxes: Pay Me Now, Not Later
Another effect of section 2702 is that it requires the early payment
of transfer taxes or a reduction in the grantor's unified credit.228 Prior
to the enactment of section 2702, the amount of the grantor's taxable
gift when the grantor retained an interest in a trust created for family
members was the value of the property transferred reduced by the
value of the grantor's retained interest. 22 9 The zero value rule of sec-
tion 2702 increases the value of the taxable gift (because the grantor's
retained interest is valued at zero) and consequently increases the
value of the gift tax payable (or unified credit used).230 Whether the
early payment of gift tax in these circumstances is good tax policy is
debatable.23' The problem with section 2702 is that the early payment
of tax is imposed on only one part of the transfer tax system by a rule
which postures as a valuation rule and with no consideration of overall
transfer tax policy.232
226. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-6(a) (1992). The regulation provides for a reduction in taxable gifts
in this situation. The amount of the reduction is the lesser of "(i) the increase in the individual's
taxable gifts resulting from the interest being valued at the time of the initial transfer under,
Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(b)(1) or (c), or (ii) [t]he increase in the individual's taxable gifts (or gross
estate) resulting from the subsequent transfer of the interest." Id. § 25.2702-6(b)(1) (1992).
But the regulation was required to deal with other problems as well. In computing an individ-
ual's taxable gifts under the above regulation, to which transfer is the annual exclusion allo-
cated? Can gift splitting be used on the later transfer of the retained interest? See Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2702-6(a)(3), (b)(2) (1992). But see id. § 25.2702-6(b)(3) (1992) (reducing any reduction in
subsequent taxable gifts (or adjusted taxable gifts) for estate tax purposes if the estate tax com-
putation would reduce the adjusted taxable gifts by the gift tax paid).
227. See id. § 25.2702-6(a)(2), (b)(1), (3) (1992).
228. I.R.C. §§ 2010(b), 2505(b).
229. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958).
230. Because the gift tax is computed on the amount of current taxable gifts and previous
taxable gifts. I.R.C. § 2502.
231. See discussion infra Part VIII.
232. See discussion infra Part VIII.
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E. Section 2702 Is Both Overinclusive and Underinclusive
One test of a statute's quality is whether it includes all cases it is
intended to apply to and no others. Section 2702 fails the test on both
counts. The most obvious case in which section 2702 is overinclusive
is the case where the grantor retains a life income interest. No abuse
was possible in this case even prior to the enactment of section 2702,
because the entire value of such a trust is included in the grantor's
gross estate.233 Under section 2702, however, the grantor of such a
trust must pay gift tax on the full value of the trust at the time of the
trust's creation and, in addition, the estate must pay a tax on the ap-
preciation of the trust property. There was no reason to change the
gift taxation scheme for this type of trust except in the context of a
total change in transfer tax structure, because it was not abusive. 234
No doubt some percentage of grantors are willing to create a trust
only if they can receive the income from the trust property for life.
Grantors should not be penalized for making such a choice. 235
As previously noted,236 the statute is also underinclusive because of
its exclusion of the transfer of personal residences in trust for family
members where the grantor retains an interest in the trust.237
The result of the overinclusion and underinclusion of section 2702 is
that certain techniques, such as GRATs, GRUTs and QPRTs and in-
deed outright gifts238 are favored, whereas GRITs, joint purchases and
retained life estates are disfavored. While abusive techniques can and
should be curbed, it is not the function of the tax system to favor cer-
tain techniques of estate planning over other techniques when the dis-
favored techniques are not abusing the system.
233. I.R.C. § 2036(a). Therefore, all appreciation between the date of the creation of the trust
and the date of the grantor's death is subject to transfer tax.
234. See generally Gans, supra note 32, at 821 (explaining that section 2702 does not favor life-
estate trusts).
235. Gans also argues that "[b]y making [section 2702] applicable to the life-estate trust as
well, however, Congress made the rules applicable to these trusts even more distortionary with-
out any justification for doing so." Id. at 822.
236. See discussion supra Part VI.F.
237. I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii).
238. See, e.g., Melcher & Arend, supra note 91, at 666-72. The authors argue, based on a
series of computations, that an outright gift is preferable to a GRAT by an appreciation rate on
the trust assets of 27%. Id. A series of overlapping two year GRATs (referred to by the authors
as "LAZY GRATs") are superior to outright gifts at a 20% appreciation rate. Id. But see Gans,
supra note 32, at 822-37 (arguing that, especially for certain assets and when the grantor pays the
income tax on trust earnings, a GRAT can be superior to an outright gift when the trust's rate of
return exceeds or perhaps is even slightly below the table rate).
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VIII. THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS: THE BANISHING OF
THE MONSTER
The foregoing has demonstrated that section 2702 did not accom-
plish its broader purpose of ending perceived abuses in split-interest
transfer tax avoidance techniques, although it did effectively eliminate
the GRIT and joint purchase. 239 It has also demonstrated that the
price paid for this "success" is quite high in terms of distortion of the
transfer tax system, complexity, overinclusion and underinclusion. Is
there a better way?
A. Limited Solutions
1. The GRIT
a. Statutory Solutions
If, as Congress appeared to believe, 240 the GRIT as a whole (rather
than just certain aspects of it) was abusive, a simple solution would
have been to amend current section 2036241 to provide that the gross
estate would include the value (as of the grantor's date of death) of
the property of any trust under which the grantor had retained a term
of years, even if the term of years had expired prior to the grantor's
death. This would have completely solved the GRIT problem with no
complications 242 and no adjustments in other Code sections. Indeed,
the amendment would be quite simple. 243 Such a solution would
avoid the problems of current section 2702 and ensure that all the
appreciation of the trust property is subject to transfer tax.
As previously noted,244 however, section 7520 addressed one of the
major concerns about the GRIT and several of the other concerns are
de minimis. The two remaining concerns were:
239. See discussion supra Part VI.
240. See discussion supra Part IV.
241. I.R.C. § 2036 (1994).
242. See Gans, supra note 32, at 816-17. The only complications would be determining what
property was in the trust when it terminated and valuing that property. The greater the length of
time between the termination of the trust and the death of the grantor, the more significant this
problem becomes.
243. One possibility would be to amend current section 2036 by using the reverse of current
section 2702(c)(3). The process would be to renumber current section 2036(c) as section
2036(d), and add a new section 2036(c) to read as follows: "(c) For the purposes of section (a),
the term 'for life' shall include an interest in the property for a term of years which expires
before the death of the decedent."
Alternatively, some limits on the application of the rule could be used. For example, a "three
years before death" rule, similar to current section 2038, might be considered. See I.R.C.
§ 2038(a). Another alternative might be to include the property in decedent's gross estate but
value it on the date the latest term of years reserved by the grantor ended.
244. See discussion supra Part V.
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1. a grantor could further reduce the taxable gift by retaining a
contingent remainder interest and a testamentary power of
appointment in the trust in case the grantor died during the
trust term; and
2. the tables assume that the entire value of the grantor's re-
tained interest is returned to the grantor by distributions of
income (that is, that the entire table rate will be realized by
the trust as income) and appreciation of the trust corpus is
not taken into account by the tables (the appreciation factor).
The first problem is relatively easy to solve. A short amendment to
the gift tax statute disallowing a reduction of a taxable gift for the
value of contingent remainder interests, testamentary powers of ap-
pointment or similar interests reserved by grantors who also reserve
term interests, would solve the problem without causing collateral ef-
fects on the rest of the system.
The appreciation problem is somewhat more difficult. The income
and appreciation factors of each trust are different. Both are depen-
dent on the original property contributed to the trust and the changes
in investments made by the trustee. Nevertheless, a solution is not
impossible. One possibility is that the Treasury Department could un-
dertake a study over a period of years to determine the average in-
come and appreciation of trusts. Following that study, the section
7520 rate could be based on the study results and reexamined periodi-
cally.245 Another possibility might be to assume that in the average
trust, one-half (or some other portion) of the table rate is income and
one-half is appreciation, and amend section 7520 accordingly. One
objection might be that lowering the rate in such a manner results in a
detriment to the government because, if the same tables are used for
both purposes, the grantor of a split-interest charitable trust might ob-
tain an increased charitable deduction. Such an argument is unfair
because it reflects a "heads I win, tails you lose" philosophy by the
government. It is poor tax policy to insist that tables be used only
when they favor the government and never when they favor the
taxpayer.246
245. It should be noted that the section 7520 tables are to be revised every 10 years to take
into account changes in mortality tables. I.R.C. § 7520(c)(3).
246. Hearings, supra note 12, at 64-65 (statement of John A. Wallace, Director, A.B.A. Pro-
bate & Trust Division). Mr. Wallace is also a member of the law firm of King & Spalding in
Atlanta. He is one of the most highly respected estate planning practitioners in the United
States. Mr. Wallace's statement is worth quoting:
This questioning of certain split interest transactions apparently reflects a concern that
the Treasury tables do not work well in the context of these two specific cases [GRITs
and joint purchases] because the taxpayer may secure an advantage if the current yield
of the subject property falls below the assumed rate of return in the tables. On the
other hand, use of the tables to determine the transfer tax consequences of gifts of life
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Yet the use of actuarial tables for dealing with estate tax problems
has been so widespread and of such long standing that we cannot
assume Congress would have balked at it here; the United States is
in business with enough different taxpayers so that the law of aver-
ages has ample opportunity to work.247
b. Case Law Solutions
One major concern with the GRIT was that in cases where the trust
property was unproductive or underproductive, the use of the tables
has not been reflective of the actual value to be attributed to the in-
come interest.248 Even before section 2702 was enacted, the Internal
Revenue Service challenged the use of the tables in this situation.2 49
In a series of cases involving the annual exclusion, 250 the Service had
some success in arguing that the tables should not be used to value the
income interest in such cases, 251 at least when the trustee did not have
the power to change investments.252 Invoking Dickman v. Commis-
sioner,25 3 a series of letter rulings applied this policy to cases where
the grantor could require conversion of unproductive property into
income producing property, but failed to do so.254 The Service con-
tended that this failure constituted a taxable gift. In a recent case, the
Service extended this contention to a common law GRIT.255 The
GRIT was funded with closely-held stock which produced annual in-
estates and terms of years, or the transfer tax implications of charitable lead and chari-
table remainder trusts, will work to the advantage of the Treasury under similar circum-
stances. We question whether a change that rejects the use of tables where they work
against the Treasury, but insists upon their application where the opposite result occurs,
represents good tax policy, and fosters likely taxpayer agreement that our transfer tax
system is fair, equitable and worthy of their highest standard of voluntary compliance.
Id.
247. Geib v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 551-52 (2d Cir. 1962) (footnote omitted); see North-
eastern Penn. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 224 (1967) (quoting Gelb,
298 F.2d at 551-51 with approval).
248. See discussion supra Part V.
249. PRACTICAL DRAMrrNo Oct. 1993, at 3328-29, 3351-53 (Richard B. Covey ed.).
250. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
251. See, e.g., Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United States, 609 F.2d 1078, 1081 (4th Cir. 1979);
Berzon v. Commissioner, 534 F.2d 528, 531-32 (2d Cir. 1976); Calder v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.
713, 730 (1985); Rev. Rul. 76-360, 1976-2 C.B. 298.
252. See Rosen v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1968) (allowing use of tables to value
present interest and allowing annual exclusion where trustees had power to sell non-dividend
paying closely held stock). But see Rev. Rul. 69-344, 1969-1 C.B. 225, 226 (stating that the I.R.S.
will not follow the holding in Rosen).
253. 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
254. PRACICAL DRAFING Oct. 1993, at 3328 (Richard B. Covey ed.) (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul.
88-01-008 (Oct. 7, 1987) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-52-050 (Oct. 3, 1990)); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-
23-007 (Feb. 18, 1987) (discussing nonpayment of noncumulative preferred stock dividends as a
means of bypassing estate and gift taxes).
255. O'Reilly v. Commissioner, 973 F.2d 1403, 1406 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'g 95 T.C. 646 (1990).
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come of .2% of the stock's value.256 The grantors attempted to value
their retained interests by using the tables. 257 The Service argued that
the tables should not be used. The Tax Court held the tables could be
used, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the use of the ta-
bles in this case would be "unrealistic and unreasonable, '258 since the
use of the tables produced a "wildly unrealistic measurement. '259
An argument certainly exists that no statutory solution should be
attempted. Rather, the resolution of whether the tables should be
used to value the grantor's retained interest in a GRIT should be al-
lowed to be resolved through continued development by cases and
rulings.
One proposal, which was not adopted, recommended importing
some of the case law just discussed into the statute.260 It was proposed
that either the Service or a taxpayer could value the property involved
in a transfer without regard to actuarial tables if it was established that
the assumptions made by the tables were, or were likely to be, sub-
stantially different from the actual experience of the trust.261 Since
the proposal was to amend section 2036(c), the effect of the proposal
permitted the use of the actual experience of the trust as evidence of
whether the tables should be applied.262 While this proposal was not
adopted in what ultimately became section 2702, it offers some evi-
dence that a proposal based on the developing case law could be an
effective way of solving the problem.
2. Joint Purchases
Assuming there is any abuse involved in a joint purchase and a con-
comitant need to regulate it,263 two relatively limited solutions come
to mind. First, if a statutory solution was necessary, adding to section
2036 a slightly reworded version of current section 2702(c)(1)-(3)
would appear to work.264 Alternatively, one might await case law de-
velopments to determine if a developing estate tax doctrine relating to
256. Id. at 1404.
257. Since the GRIT was created in 1985, the old 10% tables in Treasury Regulation section
25.2512-5(f) (1994) were used. O'Reilly, 973 F.2d at 1404.
258. Id. at 1408.
259. Id. at 1406.
260. Hearings, supra note 12, at 206-07 (statement of Donald C. Lubick, Chair, Tax Policy
Committee, Section of Taxation, District of Columbia Bar).
261. Id. at 207.
262. Id.
263. See discussion supra Part V.
264. Current section 2702(c) provides:
(1) In general.-The transfer of an interest in property with respect to which there is
[one] or more term interests shall be treated as a transfer of an interest in a trust.
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the sale of a remainder interest applies to joint purchases. In Gradow
v. United States,2 65 a case arising in a community property jurisdiction,
the decedent left a will attempting to dispose of both his and his wife's
interest in the community assets. Basically, the decedent's will gave
his widow an election. 266 If she rejected the will, she received only her
share of the community property.2 67 If she agreed with the will, she
would transfer her share of the community property into a trust,
which would include her husband's share of the community assets.268
She would receive the income from the trust for life (together with the
couple's residence and her husband's personal and household effects
and jewelry). 269 On her death, the trust property would go to the
Gradow's son.270 The widow accepted the will and added her share of
the community property to the trust.
The Service contended that, since the value of the widow's share of
community property was worth more than the value of the life income
interest in the trust, the election should be viewed as a transfer of her
community property to the trust with a retained life income interest
includable in her estate under section 2036(a).2 71 The Service con-
tended that the assets the widow gave up were not full and adequate
consideration.2 72 The court held that "full and adequate considera-
tion" required payment of an amount equal to the value of the inter-
est which would be taxed-the widow's share of community
property.2 73
(2) Joint purchases.-If [two] or more members of the same family acquire interests
in any property described in paragraph (1) in the same transaction (or a series of re-
lated transactions), the person (or persons) acquiring the term interests in such prop-
erty shall be treated as having acquired the entire property and then transferred to the
other persons the interests acquired by such other persons in the transaction (or series
of transactions). Such transfer shall be treated as made in exchange for the considera-
tion (if any) provided by such other persons for the acquisition of their interests in such
property.
(3) Term interest.-The term "term interest" means-
(A) a life interest in property, or
(B) an interest in property for a term of years.
I.R.C. § 2702(c)(1)-(3) (1994).
265. 11 Cl. Ct. 808 (1987), affd 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
266. Id. at 808, 809.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Abbin, supra note 43, at 14.
272. Gradow, 11 Cl. Ct. at 810.
273. Id. at 813. TWo recent cases that agree with the Gradow decision are Estate of
D'Ambrosio v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 252 (1995), rev'd 101 F.3d 309, 318 (3rd Cir. 1996) and
Pittman v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
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There has been a good deal of criticism of Gradow.274 In any event,
there has also been some speculation that a joint purchase should be
treated similarly to a sale of a remainder interest.275 If this suggestion
is adopted by the courts, legislation might not be needed. Keep in
mind, however, that it is dubious whether the joint purchase repre-
sents an abusive situation.276
B. The Structural Solution
1. The Real Problem
As emphasized in Jason-Part I, the driving force behind the enact-
ment of section 2036(c) and later Chapter 14 was estate freezing, par-
ticularly corporate recapitalizations used as estate planning devices.277
Trusts and joint purchases were very much an afterthought. 278 After
the disastrous experience with section 2036(c), 279 and the criticism of
the practicing bar and commentators that the wrong approach had
been taken and that recapitalizations were valuation problems rather
than inclusion problems,28o Congress reversed focus. In developing
Chapter 14, Congress treated corporate recapitalizations and similar
techniques as valuation problems.281 Again, trusts went along for the
ride. But in trying to solve the problems created by GRITs and joint
purchases by using valuation solutions, Congress made as crucial a
mistake as it did when, in enacting section 2036(c), it treated corpo-
rate recapitalizations as estate inclusion problems. The central prob-
lem with section 2702 is that, if any problem exists with the GRIT and
the joint purchase, it is not a valuation problem, it is a problem of
inclusion and exclusion.
The problem of estate freezing through corporate recapitalization
was correctly characterized as a valuation problem.282 The problem
was determining the correct valuation of the senior (preferred) and
junior (common or growth) interests. The "bells and whistles" added
to the preferred interests often resulted in incorrect valuations for
these interests.28 3 Since generally only the preferred interests were
274. See, e.g., Abbin, supra note 43, at 17-22.
275. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-12-036 (Dec. 23, 1993); PRACTICAL DRA NTG Oct. 1993, at 3427-28
(Richard B. Covey ed.).
276. See discussion supra Part V.
277. Begleiter, Jason-Part 1, supra note 6, at 537-45.
278. See discussion supra Part VI.A.
279. Begleiter, Jason-Part 1, supra note 6, at 545-56.
280. Id. at 545-58.
281. Id. at 556-58.
282. Id. at 584.
283. Id. at 536-37.
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retained by the older generation and the common interests given to
members of the younger generation, very little gift tax was paid. The
question was truly one of correctly valuing the preferred and common
interests.
On the other hand, in a GRIT there is no significant question of
how to value the retained and transferred interests.284 The problem is
that a retained interest is not a transfer subject to the gift tax.285
Otherwise stated, interests retained by the grantor are not included in
the term "taxable gift," on which the gift tax is computed. 28 6 More
specifically, the transfer tax sections allow a transfer to be divided into
temporal interests,28 7 and interests which are reserved in the grantor
are not taxed.288 Since a gift tax on the transferred interests is im-
posed on the date of the transfer, the transferred property must be
valued on the date of the transfer and only the value of the transferred
interests is taxed.289 No further gift is made when the grantor's re-
tained term interest expires290 because all that is transferred at that
time is the remainder interest and that has already been taxed.
In short, it is the rule taxing a gift at the time of the transfer and
allowing the splitting of the transfer into various temporal segments
that allows any transfer tax savings on a GRIT. The tax savings on a
joint purchase are also possible because of the splitting of the interests
in property between the life estate and remainder, with different per-
sons owning each interest.291
The problem of allowing a transfer to be divided into different tem-
poral interests and not taxing those temporal interests retained by the
284. The only question is whether the tables really value these interests correctly. To say that
the tables are inadequate is really an attack on the use of tables in any case, rather than saying
that a better valuation method can be developed.
285. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (as amended in 1994).
286. I.R.C. §§ 2502, 2503 (1994).
287. For example, life income interests, terms of years and remainders.
288. More technically, interests reserved to the grantor render the gift partially incomplete.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958). As to those parts of the gift which are incomplete, no transfer
tax is imposed.
289. Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 35, at 18.
290. Id.
291. This is possible because the law prior to section 2702 did not view the purchase of tempo-
ral interests for the current value of those interests as a transfer of the entire asset, including the
appreciation, to the remainderman at the death of the life tenant. There was no gift at the time
of creation, since each purchaser paid the value of his or her interest. There was no gift on
death, because the life estate simply expired. Nothing was transferred on death. See also Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) (as amended in 1983) (stating that the gift tax does not apply to transfers
occurring by reason of the death of the donor, since the statue is confined to transfers by living
donors). And the life estate, since it expired on death, is not included in the owner's gross
estate. See, e.g., Helvering v. Rhodes' Estate, 117 F.2d 509, 510 (8th Cir. 1941); Frew v. Bowers,
12 F.2d 625, 627 (2d Cir. 1926).
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grantor is a question of inclusion and exclusion, not of valuation. The
interests retained by the grantor are not taxable gifts.292 They are in-
complete gifts not subject to the gift tax.293
The concept of dividing a transfer into temporal segments has been
embedded in the transfer tax law for many years. As early as 1945,
the Supreme Court could state: "Accordingly, it has been held that if
the income of a trust is required to be distributed periodically, as an-
nually, but distribution of the corpus is deferred, the gift of the income
is one of a present interest, that of the corpus, one in futuro.' '294 The
principle continues to be recognized in the current tax law.295
Given that section 2702 deals with the inclusion and exclusion of
interests, rather than the valuation of these interests, another aspect
of the problem of section 2702 becomes apparent. Valuation
problems are often confined to particular situations. A narrowly-tai-
lored provision applicable to one situation can be employed to solve
such problems without causing a domino effect. The solution to the
valuation problem will generally not impact other provisions of the
transfer tax system. An example is found in Code section 2701 which
involves a valuation problem.296 While the solution to the corporate
freeze was complicated, section 2701 does not impact heavily on other
transfer tax sections. 297 Another example is the enactment of section
7520 in 1988.298 The change greatly affected the valuation of temporal
interests in property, but had almost no effect on the structure of the
transfer tax system.
A problem involving the inclusion or exclusion of an interest in the
transfer tax system, however, is usually not so easy to fix. Any change
in the treatment of such an interest usually has effects on other parts
of the transfer tax system. These effects must be taken into account in
formulating the solution. One example, already mentioned, is that
292. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (1958).
293. Id. This rule is similar to the rule that a gift is not complete until the donor parts with
dominion and control, which has been part of the gift tax law since the gift tax was first enacted.
Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 286 (1933); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b), (c) (as amended in
1983).
294. Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 21 (1945) (citing Sensenbrenner v. Commissioner,
134 F.2d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 1943) and Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 1942)).
295. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (as amended in 1994). In addition, section 2503 allows an
annual exclusion only for gifts of present interests. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1994). The determination
of what is a present interest also involves separating a transfer into temporal interests. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2503-3 (as amended in 1983).
296. Belgeiter, Jason-Part 1, supra note 6, at 584.
297. The solution chosen did require some adjustments to later gifts and to the estate tax,
Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-5 (1992), but that was primarily due to the solution chosen, rather than the
nature of the problem.
298. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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Code section 2702, in attempting to deal with the GRIT, also im-
pacted the reserved life income interest.2 99 Prior to the enactment of
section 2702, a grantor who created a trust and reserved a life income
interest made a gift of the value of the remainder interest,300 although
the entire trust would be included in the grantor's gross estate when
the grantor died.30' Under section 2702, the grantor pays a gift tax on
the full value of the property on the creation of the trust.302 The trust
is still included in grantor's gross estate30 3 but the trust is not an ad-
justed taxable gift.3° 4 The point is that section 2702 impacts the re-
served life income interest and other aspects of the transfer tax
system. This is because section 2702 ignores the grantor's retained
interest only for certain gift tax purposes and only for certain trans-
fers.305 No changes were made in other transfer tax sections impacted
by retained interests, thus causing the unintended effects and compli-
cations discussed in this Article. 306 Such an approach can work in a
valuation section because in many cases a change in the valuation of
an interest has minimal impact on the Code's transfer tax structure. A
structural change, however, such as the enactment of section 2702,
usually impacts the transfer tax system beyond the immediate provi-
sion. Therefore, to solve a structural problem, such as the splitting of
an asset into temporal interests, a structural change in the system is
required. 30 7 To confuse a valuation provision, which generally has a
limited impact on other provisions, with a structural change, which
299. See discussion supra Part VI.D, E.
300. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e) (as amended in 1994).
301. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1994).
302. Id. § 2702(a), (c)(3).
303. Id. § 2036(a).
304. Id. § 2001(b).
305. Id. § 2702(a).
306. Gans, supra note 32, at 817.
307. It might be noted that the same approach taken in section 2702 was used in limiting the
charitable deduction in 1969. See discussion supra Parts VI.E, VII. The solution could validly be
employed in the charitable area because in the charitable area a deduction question was in-
volved, rather than a question of inclusion and exclusion. Because deductions are a matter of
legislative grace, see, for example, Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Inter-
state Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helver-
ing, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934), Congress has great leeway in limiting or qualifying deductions
without affecting the basic structure of the transfer tax. This is why the 1969 changes to the
charitable deduction could work without causing the problems which occur with section 2702.
The limits on interests which qualify for the charitable deduction and the governing instrument
requirements are limited to qualifying for the deduction, and do not affect the basic tax struc-
ture. Section 2702 however, because it impacts on the basic inclusion-exclusion issue of whether
a gift is complete, ignores the impact that the zero valuation rule has on the transfer tax structure
of the Code.
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usually has ripple effects well beyond the problem at which it is di-
rected, can have serious and unexpected consequences. 30 8
A structural solution to the problem posed by GRITs and joint
purchases and other problems caused by recognizing temporal inter-
ests in property would involve adopting one rule applicable to all
transfer tax aspects of such split interests in trusts. Fortunately, a
great deal of work has already been done in this area.309 Basically, the
proposals divide into two positions. One position is the so-called
"easy to complete" rule, providing that most transfers are subject to
the gift tax and not the estate tax. 310 The other position is the "hard
to complete" rule, which provides that gifts are incomplete if any sub-
stantial interest is retained, and subjects most transfers with retained
interest to the estate tax. 31' Detailed comment and evaluation of
308. An example of confusing the issues of completion of a gift and valuation was noted by
the court in Estate of DiMarco v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 653 (1986). The case involved the
question of whether a corporate survivor's benefit plan providing for income to the spouse of an
employee was a gift by the employee to his spouse. Id. at 654. The Service contended that the
employee made a gift when he became employed by the corporation, but because the value of
the benefit could not be determined on that date, the gift should be treated as incomplete until
the benefit could be valued (on the employee's death). Id. at 659-60. The court, in rejecting this
contention, noted the following:
In addition, we believe that respondent has confused the issues of completion and
valuation in this case .... We also question, however, whether the fact that the value of
transferred property cannot be readily determined at the time of the transfer is relevant
in determining whether the transfer is complete for gift tax purposes. We have noted
above that transfers of property are complete and subject to the gift tax at the time the
donor relinquishes dominion and control over the transferred property. Nothing in the
statute or the regulations suggests that, even if a donor relinquishes dominion and con-
trol over transferred property, the transfer is or can be considered to be incomplete for
gift tax purposes if the value of the property is uncertain .... Accordingly, we reject
any suggestion by respondent either that transfers of property are incomplete for gift
tax purposes simply because "no realistic value can be placed" on the property at the
time the transfer occurs, or that transfers of property become complete for gift tax
purposes only when the value of the transferred property can be easily ascertained.
Id. at 660-61.
309. The leading efforts are AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION
(1969) [hereinafter ALl PROJECr]; 2 U.S. TREASURY DEPT., TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIM-
PLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH-GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT
PROPOSALS (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter TREASURY PROPOSALS]; Harry L. Gutman, A Comment on
the ABA Tax Section Task Force Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 653 (1987-
88); and Jerome Kurtz & Stanley S. Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury
Proposals, the Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1970); Task Force Report,
supra note 58.
310. Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 309, at 1375-76. Section 2702 could be viewed as adopting an
"easy to complete" rule for the limited purposes of determining whether a transfer is a gift and
the amount of the gift. However, section 2702 is deficient in that it does not make the rule
applicable to the estate tax and to other areas (such as the annual exclusion) affected by its rule.
311. The Section of Taxation Task Force advocated such a rule with respect to retained in-
come interests and completely revocable trusts, but an easy to complete rule with respect to
other retained powers and retained future interests. Task Force Report, supra note 58, at 405-10.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
these proposals has been done elsewhere and is beyond the scope of
this Article.312 What is important is that a structural problem must be
solved by a structural change and a structural change makes the
change generally applicable to all areas of the transfer tax system in
which the problem occurs. A structural problem cannot be rectified
by an isolated change to one part of the system because a problem of
inclusion and exclusion permeates the system. A section such as 2702
is doomed to failure because of an inadequate perception of the prob-
lem and a solution which cannot possibly work on a structural
problem.
IX. CONCLUSION: JASON LIVES
The addition of Chapter 14 to the Code in 1990 (as well as its prede-
cessor, former section 2036(c)) was the first real statutory attempt to
attack sophisticated estate planning techniques. The focus of concern
and certainly the leading worry was corporate recapitalizations. This
concern dictated the formulation of section 2036(c) and, when that
proved unworkable, Chapter 14. That corporate recapitalizations
were the primary focus is evidenced by the amount of space devoted
to that problem in the legislative history, as discussed in this Article as
well as in Jason-Part I, which examined section 2701. 313 As dis-
cussed, the critics of section 2036(c) were quite correct that the "estate
freeze" problem was a question of valuation. In enacting section 2701,
Congress attacked the problem from the correct perspective. 314 The
Gutman agrees as to retained life estates, but questions the rule in other aspects. See Gutman,
supra note 309, at 675-81. The Treasury studies similarly recommended a hard to complete rule
for retained beneficial interests and revocable transfers, but an easy to complete rule for re-
tained powers and reversionary interests (with some qualifications). TREASURY PROPOSALS,
supra note 309, at 378-80. The American Law Institute recommendation was similar. See ALl
PROJECT, supra note 309, at 41-47; see also Gans, supra note 32, at 815 (discussing both of the
proposed alternative approaches); Llewellyn, supra note 91, at 223 (explaining the "hard to com-
plete" rule for preventing undervaluation of remainder interests following retained interests).
312. See supra note 309. It should be noted, however, that a hard to complete rule for re-
tained interests subjects appreciation to the transfer tax system. An easy to complete rule has
the advantage of disposing of all taxation at the time of transfer and leaving nothing remaining
for future consideration. It also makes passing of certain difficult to treat assets, such as farms
and closely held businesses, to the next generation much more easily accomplished. One com-
mentator has noted that the pre-section 2702 system didn't work because the transfer tax system
evaluated all gifts at the time of transfer and had no mechanism to take into account post-
transfer appreciation, except for the life income interest. McCaffrey, supra note 91, at 47-48.
Moreover, the system contained no method of assessing an additional tax if later events showed
the assumptions on which the original valuation and tax were based were not accurate. Id. at 55.
313. Begleiter, Jason-Part I, supra note 6.
314. That is not to say that the solution Congress chose was correct. A number of matters in
section 2701 could have been clarified, and some aspects incorporated in it are quite debatable.
Moreover, technical changes will also be needed. See id.
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legislation covering trusts was of secondary importance in the debate
leading up to both section 2036(c) and Chapter 14. The question of
whether the problems of corporate recapitalizations on one hand, and
GRITs and joint purchases on the other, were the same, received little
or no examination or analysis. In section 2702, Congress took a valua-
tion approach to the perceived problems of trusts. What emerged was
a statute which effectively ends the use of GRITs and joint purchases
(except as to personal residences) as estate planning tools. The price
for this result, however, is very high. The statute does not accomplish
its broader goal of making it impossible to beat the tables, it simply
substitutes GRATs for GRITs. Section 2702 and the regulations is-
sued under it are extremely complex and have substantial impact on
other gift tax and estate tax provisions of the Code. The section 2702
exception for personal residences has fostered a whole new estate
planning technique which appears to be gaining popularity. The stat-
ute is both overinclusive and underinclusive. The problems created by
section 2702 are serious. It is unlikely that they will be corrected in
the near future.
If Congress is merely concerned with GRITs and joint purchases,
specific legislation could be crafted to deal with the individual
problems perceived with these techniques.315 More specifically, legis-
lation could attack the true abusive aspects of the GRIT which in-
clude: (i) retention of and allowance for reductions in the value of
taxable gifts for retained contingent remainder interests and powers of
appointment; and (ii) failure of the tables to account for apprecia-
tion.316 Such legislation, to be effective, would require a limited gift
tax revision together with a change in the section 7520 table rates.317
Joint purchases and GRITs could also be attacked through a limited
estate tax inclusion approach.318 However, the case for joint
purchases being abusive is far less convincing than the case for certain
aspects of the GRIT being so. Indeed, the case against joint purchases
appears, at bottom, to be that sophisticated taxpayers who adopt this
technique save some transfer taxes.319 This is hardly abusive.320 A
315. See discussion supra Part VIII.A.
316. See discussion supra Part VIII.A.1.
317. See discussion supra Part VIII.A.1.
318. See discussion supra Part VIII.A.2.
319. See discussion supra Part V.B.
320. It has long been the rule that using valid techniques to save taxes is not abusive at all, but
perfectly legal.
As to the astuteness of taxpayers in ordering their affairs so as to minimize taxes[,]
courts have said that "the very meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may
go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it." Superior Oil Company v. Mississippi,
280 U.S. 390, 395-96 [(1930) (J. Holmes)]. This is so because "nobody owes any public
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strong argument can be made not only for repeal of section 2702 re-
garding joint purchases, but also that no new legislation should be en-
acted regulating joint purchases because they are not abusive. 321
The major reason for the failure of section 2702 is that it attacked
the perceived problem in the wrong way. If the concern of Congress
is broader than GRITs and joint purchases and extends to all trusts
because of the recognition of different temporal interests in property,
then the problem is a tax base (or inclusion-exclusion) problem, not a
valuation problem. Tax base problems are structural problems which
require structural solutions. Such problems cannot be rectified by in-
sular provisions taking a valuation approach: such provisions are inca-
pable of treating structural problems. Several structural changes
which would address such problems have been suggested in recent
years. If Congress is serious about legislating with regard to trusts, it
should examine these suggestions. In any event, repeal of section
2702 should be seriously considered.
duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary
contributions." Learned Hand, C.J., dissenting in Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d
848, 851 [(2d Cir. 1947)].
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 172-73 (1947).
"The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted." Gregory v. Helver-
ing, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). In addition "a taxpayer is free to arrange his financial affairs to
minimize his tax liability; thus, the presence of tax avoidance motives will not nullify an other-
wise bona fide transaction." Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867, 869 (6th Cir.
1973) (citations omitted); see Nyhus v. Travel Mgmt. Corp., 466 F.2d 440, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 113 F.2d 557, 564 (10th Cir. 1940); Helvering v. Johnson, 104 F.2d
140, 143 (8th Cir. 1939); Gaddis v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 741, 755 (S.D. Miss. 1971).
321. See discussion supra Part V.B.
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